Employment Discrimination and Labor Arbitrators: A Question of Competence by Bartlett, Anthony F., Pace University School of Law
Volume 85 | Issue 5 Article 5
June 1983
Employment Discrimination and Labor
Arbitrators: A Question of Competence
Anthony F. Bartlett Pace University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact
ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Anthony F. Bartlett Pace University School of Law, Employment Discrimination and Labor Arbitrators: A Question of Competence, 85 W.
Va. L. Rev. (1983).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol85/iss5/5
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND LABOR
ARBITRATORS: A QUESTION OF COMPETENCE
ANTHONY F. BARTLETT*
During the Second World War labor arbitration came to prominence in
the United States as an important means of resolving disputes between labor
and management. In the post-War years it gradually achieved a pre-eminent
position in the American collective bargaining system, finally acquiring the im-
primatur of the Supreme Court in 1960. Crucial to the Court's rationale for
requiring virtual judicial abstension in regard to labor arbitration was its per-
ception of the arbitration process as an informal and flexible system manned
by arbitrators who were in possession of a high level of competence in the real-
ities of labor relations. This view of arbitral expertise was not seriously chal-
lenged until the Court's decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co." in
which it was held that prior submission of a minority person's dispute with a
company to arbitration under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement
did not foreclose access to federal court under the provisions of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 The essentially private machinery of labor arbitra-
tion was felt to be inadequate for coping with the important public policy is-
sues behind employment discrimination legislation.3 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, did not totally deny any useful role to labor arbitration where minority
rights were concerned. In its famous Footnote 21' of Gardner-Denver, it stated
that varying degrees of weight would be accorded an arbitrator's award insofar
as certain criteria were met.' One such criterion was the "special competence of
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, LL.B. (1969), LL.M. (1970), The
Queen's University, Belfast, Ireland. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful research as-
sistance of Barbara O'Malley, law student, Pace University School of Law.
1 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (1) to (17) (1976), amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-15 (1970).
3 In Gardner-Denver, the Court noted that: "Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the
resolution of contractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the
final resolution of rights created by Title VII." 415 U.S. at 56.
1 Id. at 60.
5 The Court provided the following guidelines:
We adopt no standards as to the weight to be accorded an arbitral decision, since
this must be determined in the court's discretion with regard to the facts and circum-
stances of each case. Relevant factors include the existence of provisions in the collective
bargaining agreement that conform substantially with Title VII, the degree of procedural
fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the record with respect to the issue of dis-
crimination, and the special competence of particular arbitrators. Where an arbitral de-
termination gives full consideration to an employee's Title VII rights, a court may prop-
erly accord it great weight. This is especially true where the issue is solely one of fact,
specifically addressed by the parties and decided by the arbitrator on the basis of an
adequate record. But courts should ever be mindful that Congress, in enacting Title VII,
thought it necessary to provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of discrimina-
tory employment claims. It is the duty of courts to assure the full availability of this
forum.
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 60 n.21.
1
Bartlett: Employment Discrimination and Labor Arbitrators: A Question of Co
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1983
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
particular arbitrators."8
This Article examines the competence which labor arbitrators are said to
possess generally, with particular reference to its potential for application
where employment discrimination is also involved, in the hope of shedding
some light upon the "special competence" requirement of Footnote 21. Such an
undertaking demands, of necessity, an analysis and evaluation of the total pro-
cess within which arbitral competence is exercised. Relevant aspects of this will
therefore be considered. Part I will deal with arbitral expertise as manifested
in the resolution of disputes over the interpretation and application of the
terms of collective agreements and will include evaluations of this traditional
function of the arbitration system from the sometimes varying viewpoints of
the courts, labor and management, arbitration scholars, and some of the more
celebrated critics of labor arbitration. Part II will examine features of the arbi-
tration process which might serve to detract from its usefulness as an adjudica-
tive mechanism where employment discrimination matters are linked to dis-
puted terms of a collective agreement-such as evidence admission and
procedure at the arbitration hearing-and which therefore highlight the nature
of judicial concern as to the adequacy of arbitration to redress discrimination.
Also examined is the caution expressed by the Court in relation to the qualifi-
cations of labor arbitrators in dealing with the more stringent requirements of
Title VII, as opposed to the purely voluntary objectives of collective agree-
ments. Part III will consist of an analysis of the problems involved in attempt-
ing to construct an accommodation between the function for which labor arbi-
tration was originally established and the public policy objectives of Title VII,
as well as an evaluation of the impact of arbitral competence in this controver-
sial area.
I. THE TRADITIONAL ROLE
Arbitration as a means of resolving industrial conflict between unions and
employers was used on a sporadic basis from the late nineteenth century to the
beginning of the Second World War.7 During the War it achieved a singular
degree of acceptance from both sides of industry as the primary means of ad-
justing differences arising from the collective bargaining relationship,8 and the
National War Labor Board was established to provide the services of arbitra-
tors in order to maintain the highest possible level of industrial stability in
furtherance of the War effort.' The competence of labor arbitrators in this pe-
riod in dealing with the issues referred to them was unquestioned, and many
persons who are today representative of the highest degree of arbitral integrity
and skill first made their reputations with the War Labor Board.1" The alter-
6 Id.
See R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS 1-14 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
FLEMING].
8 H. METz, LABOR POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 263-66 (1945).
J. LOEWENBERG, Compulsory Arbitration in the United States, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION,
AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 141, 143 (1976).
10 M. HERZOG & M. STONE, Grievance Arbitration in the United States, COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
[Vol. 85
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I
native to industrial strife which the arbitration process preserted was not lost
on many employers and unions; and so agreements to arbitrate collective bar-
gaining disputes and differences over the interpretation and application of col-
lective agreements were made subject to arbitration on a v luntary basis in
many industries in the post-War years."
The Taft-Hartley Act of 194712 had as one of its more significant measures
a provision making collective agreements legally enforceable as contracts."3
This, together with an accompanying provision encouraging the resolution of
differences by voluntary means between the parties,14 gave the collective agree-
ment firm legislative backing as the source of rights and obligations between
labor and management. 5 The basic skills required of labor arbitrators became
those of contract interpretation and application, and they would appear to
have exercised them ably, as testified in part b the fact that by the mid-1950s
over 90 percent of American collective agreements had grievance procedures
culminating in arbitration.' Arbitral competence was largely assumed as a
given feature in these years; the more important issue was the legal status of
an arbitrator's award. Earlier, a serious challenge to the constitutional validity
of that section of Taft-Hartley-section 301-which made the source of an ar-
bitrator's award, the collective agreement, legally enforceable had been
mounted, 17 but the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the section
ING 212, 214-216 (A. Flanders 1969).
11 Id. at 215.
'2 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as LMRA].
1' Id. at § 301(a) 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between
any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or with-
out regard to the citizenship of the parties.
14 Id. § 203(d). 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) provides, in pertinent part:
"Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desira-
ble method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an
existing collective-bargaining agreement."
5 One author commented:
Section 301's provision for damage suits by employers and unions against each other
for breach of contract and its designation of the federal courts to enforce both agree-
ments to arbitrate and arbitration awards have contributed without doubt in some de-
gree to improving both the quality and stability of contract administration.
H. DAVEY, CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 80 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as H. DAVEY].
16 H. DAVEY, LABOR ARBITRATION: A CURRENT APPRAISAL, INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS
REVIEW 85 (1955-56).
'7 The basis of the challenge was that § 301 required a federal substantive law for the enforce-
ment of collective agreements, in violation of article III, section 2 of the Constitution which pro-
vides, in pertinent part: "The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising
under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and -- to controversies -- between citizens
of different states. .. ."
Prior to the enactment of § 301 the law relating to collective agreements was state law under
which such agreements were not, in general, enforceable. See Bartlett & Lowry, Collective Agree-
ments in the United States and Britain: Status and Consequences, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 469, 470-75
(1979). It Was accordingly alleged that Congress was creating a federal procedural right of action
19831
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in its celebrated Lincoln Mills decision."8 This timely salvaging of section 301
assured the survival and growth of the arbitration process to the extent that by
1966 over 94 percent of collective agreements had binding arbitration as the
terminal step in their grievance procedures."9
The status of an arbitral award, or in a wider context, the relationship
between the arbitration process and the courts, had been put in question by a
New York Court as early as 1947 in the Cutler-Hammer0 decision, which an
arbitration scholar termed the "bete noir" of labor arbitrators.21 That court
found that a clause in a collective agreement providing for arbitration of a
disputed matter was to be treated as any other term in any other type of con-
tract and denied any unique role to a labor arbitrator. 2 This construction
where there was no federal substantive law.
Further, as § 301(a) purported to waive the diversity jurisdiction, the best that the section
provided, it was felt, was for a new forum - i.e. a federal one - wherein state law would be applied;
see Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437
(1955).
If the section is given the meaning its language spontaneously yields, it would seem clear
that all it does is to give procedural directions to the federal courts. "When an unincor-
porated association that happens to be a labor union appears before you as a litigant in a
case involving breach of a collective agreement," Congress in effect told the district
judges, "treat it as though it were a natural or corporate legal person and do so regard-
less of the amount in controversy and do not require diversity of citizenship."
Id. at 443.
'8 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). This landmark decision resulted from
an action by a union to compel an employer to arbitrate certain grievances arising under their
collective agreement and arbitrable under the applicable arbitration clause. The Supreme Court
found that Congress, in pursuance of its authority under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,
had the power to create a federal substantive law for the enforcement of collective agreements. Id.
at 457. The Court outlined where this new federal law could be found:
We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal law,
which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws. The Labor
Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive law. It points out what
the parties may or may not do in certain situations. Other problems will lie in the pe-
numbra of express statutory sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the
legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial
inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem. Federal interpretation of
federal law will govern, not state law. But state law, if compatible with the purpose of §
301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal
policy. Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an
independent source of private rights.
Id. at 456-57 (citations omitted).
19 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS: ARBITRATION PROCEDURES, BULL. No. 1425-26, at 5 (1966).
20 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 A.D. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317,
aff'd, 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947).
21 B. ADELL, THE LEGAL STATUS OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS IN ENGLAND, THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA 92 (1970).
22 It is for the Court to determine whether the contract contains a provision for arbitra-
tion of the dispute tendered, and in the exercise of that jurisdiction the Court must
determine whether there is such a dispute. If the meaning of the provision of the con-
tract sought to be arbitrated is beyond dispute, there cannot be anything to arbitrate
and the contract cannot be said to provide for arbitration.
Cutler-Hammer, 67 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
[Vol. 85
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seemed feasible, as on its face, section 301(a) granted access to courts for en-
forcement of a promise to arbitrate grievances, and after Lincoln Mills such
promises could be specifically enforced.23 The Cutler-Hammer tendency in
some lower courts posited a conflict between the potential for a court to exer-
cise its contract interpretation capacity in relation to arbitration clauses in col-
lective agreements and the purely private and self-governing role which was
considered by many to be an essential feature of labor arbitration.14 However,
prevention of a widespread interventionist role for the judiciary in the arbitra-
tion process was made the order of the day by the Supreme Court in its semi-
nal Steelworkers' Trilogy,25 which gave labor arbitration the august role in
American collective bargaining which it holds to the present.2"
The Court stated that the judicial function was to be limited to determin-
ing whether or not a particular collective agreeiaent provided for disputed sub-
ject-matter to be arbitrated,27 and if so provided, all disputes must go to arbi-
tration, not merely those which a court might deem meritorious.2 Any doubt
as to arbitrability was to be resolved in favor of arbitration.2 The Court placed
a limit on this wide-ranging allocation of authority to arbitrators by declaring
that an arbitral award would be protected from judicial overthrow only where
23 Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456.
See, e.g., Beneduce, Labor Arbitration and the Courts, 5 ARB. J., 169 (1950).
In view of the fact that the principal value of arbitration is the fact that it is a speedy
method of resolving labor controversies by arbitrators who are skilled in labor relations,
this tendency of the courts to decide cases on their merits is a cause of serious concern. If
this trend continues there will soon be a decline of arbitration as a mode of settling labor
controversies, which decline would unquestionably be a backward step in the develop-
ment of the peaceful settlement of labor disputes.
Id. at 172.
See also Guthrie, Arbitration and Industrial Self-Government, 1958 Paoc. OF THE ELEVENTH
ANN. MEETING NAT'L AcAD. OF ARB., VII.
[A] system of arbitration as the terminal point in the grievance procedure is essential for
the functioning of industrial self-government. It not only provides a final resolution of
such disputes, which is very important, but it is also a system within the control of the
parties. The judge who determines the dispute is selected by them, and they may agree
and stipulate the powers which he will wield. Thus they have fashioned their own legisla-
tion, and have created their own scheme of administration.
Id. at XII.
" United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). When referred to collectively these decisions will be cited as the
Steelworkers' Trilogy in the remainder of this article.
20 Smith, Arbitrability - The Arbitrator, The Courts and the Parties, 17 ARB. J. 3 (1962):
The United States Supreme Court, in the necessarily uneven distribution of the wealth
of its legal resources, has dealt generously with the labor lawyers of the country. In our
field which is relativly new, one can think off-hand of a substantial number of
"landmark", if not epochal, decisions, which have had a major impact in shaping labor
relations law - The Court's June, 1960 trilogy of decisions - must be counted an im-
portant addition to this group."
Id.
27 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
28 Id.
2 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
19831
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its essence was based on the collective agreement." The Court compiled a tax-
onomy of the advantages that it alleged were possessed by the arbitration pro-
cess and labor arbitrators. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that it
considered an arbitrator to be in possession of a "common law" of collective
bargaining which underlay the wording of collective agreements31 and that
judges apparently did not share this specialized knowledge.3 2 The Court elabo-
rated further on what it considered to be the extraordinary competence held
by arbitrators:
The parties expect that his [the arbitrator's] judgment of a particular griev-
ance will reflect not only what the contract says but, insofar as the collective
bargaining agreement permits, such factors as the effect upon productivity of a
particular result, its consequences to the morale of the shop, his judgment
whether tensions will be heightened or diminished. For the parties' objective in
using the arbitration process is primarily to further their common goal of unin-
terrupted production under the agreement, to make the agreement serve their
specialized needs. The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same expe-
rience and competence to bear upon the determinaton of a grievance, because
he cannot be similarly informed.3 3
This generous pronouncement on arbitral skill and experience would re-
quire much more than the exercise of fundamental contract interpretation
techniques, even though such techniques theoretically form the basis of the
parties' assessment of an arbitrator's competence.3 4 Far from wishing to be
considered in possession of the knowledge and experience deemed necessary by
the Supreme Court, many prominent arbitrators denied any other role to
themselves than that of the interpretation and application of disputed terms of
a collective agreement."
30 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960):
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining
agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of
course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it
draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words
manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement
of the award.
See also Torrington v. Metal Product Workers' Union, 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966).
3' United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
31 Id. at 581. The labor arbitrator performs functions which are not normal to the courts; the
considerations which help him fashion judgments may indeed be foreign to the competence of
courts.
31 Id. at 582.
34 F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 297 (3d ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as
F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI].
30 See, e.g., Davey, The Supreme Court and Arbitration: The Musings of An Arbitrator, 36
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 138 (1960-61).
Arbitrators, being human, cannot fail to be impressed with the respect which the Court
manifests for the superior knowledge, ability and wisdom of arbitrators. This deference
to the specialized knowledge of arbitrators, which the Court feels apparently cannot be
equaled by the "ablest judge," is certainly most gracious. At the risk of appearing un-
grateful and traitorous to the arbitration profession, I shall venture the observation that
such unstinted praise is in many cases probably not deserved - most employers and
unions in my acquaintance do not want arbitrators to function in the "philosopher king"
[Vol. 85
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A brief survey of the manner in which arbitrators are called upon by the
parties may serve to illustrate the unrealistic nature of our highest Court's esti-
mation of arbitral abilities and experience and, for that matter, what both la-
bor and management expect from labor arbitrators. Labor arbitration in the
United States is conducted on either an ad hoc or permanent basis, 36 depend-
ing upon the industries involved.3" An ad hoc arbitrator is so termed because
he is normally mandated by the parties to hear and determine only the sub-
ject-matter of the instant dispute referred to him,38 with no guarantee that his
services will be called upon for the resolution of differences in the future be-
tween the concerned interests.8 9 Most of the arbitration workload in this coun-
try is performed on an ad hoc basis40 because of its several advantages. These
include: the ability to change arbitrators as disputes arise;" leaving the union
and employer free to re-select or reject particular arbitrators as they deem ap-
propriate; the ability to call upon arbitrators with specialist qualifications for
specific disputes;' 2 and obvious savings in arbitration costs as they are called
upon only when differences require determination, "3 with no retainer fee in-
volved.4' Given these perspectives it is easy to appreciate that arbitrators se-
lected for ad hoc purposes can hardly be thought of as bringing to bear upon
their determinations an experience45 and competence that the "ablest judge"
manner suggested by the Court's statement.
On the contrary, most employers and unions choose arbitrators who will go strictly
by the statute law of their relationship (i.e. the contract) and not by the so-called com-
mon law of the shop which might in fact turn out to be nothing more than the arbitra-
tor's personal view as to what would be "good" for the parties. The writer has arbitrated
many cases where he felt the subjective considerations referred to in the Court's dictum,
such as heightening or reducing tensions in the shop, called for one decision and the
contract itself for another. In such cases most parties expect the arbitrator to follow the
contract and to eschew the temptation to become a statesman. (Emphasis as in original.)
Id. at 140.
31 A. SLOANE & F. WITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS 239-40 (3d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as A.
SLOANE & F. WITNEY].
37R. HELFGOTr, LABOR ECONOMICS 154 (2d ed. 1980).
38 R. COULSON, LABOR ARBITRATON - WHAT You NEED To KNow 53 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
R. COULSON].
" Although the option is, of course, left open to the parties to retain those ad hoc arbitrators
whose performance proves satisfactory, see F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 34, at 69.
40 W. HOLLEY & K. JENNINGS, THE LABOR RELATIONS PROCESS 278 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
W. HOLLEY & K. JENNINGS].
" A. SLOANE & F. WITNEY, supra note 36, at 239.
42 F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 34, at 70.
43 M. STONE, LABOR-MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS AT WORK 2 (1961) [hereinafter cited as M.
STONE].
" This is an important consideration in inflationary times, although, as the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service reported, arbitration costs have lagged behind the rate of inflation, see
1978 LAB. REL. Y. B. (BNA) 347.
4' Professor Getman has commented:
It is difficult to explain how arbitrators generally can lay claim to special knowledge
about industrial relations. Most arbitrators do not have prior management experience,
and they are most unlikely to have been union officials. They rarely have experience
working at the jobs about which they are deciding. Indeed, the selection process discour-
ages people with practical experience in labor relations, since anyone identified with one
side is likely to be unacceptable to the other.
1983]
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cannot share."6
A permanent arbitrator is one selected by both the union and the em-
ployer to hear and determine disputes arising under their agreement." His ap-
pointment is for a specified time or the duration of the contract,4s or some-
times at the pleasure of the parties.' 9 There are many advantages in using the
services of this type of arbitrator. Once he is chosen, labor and management
are spared the harrowing and time-consuming problem of selection as each dis-
pute arises,50 unlike collective bargaining relationships which require only ad
hoc arbitration. Also, advanced selection permits a careful and unhurried con-
sideration of his qualifications and credentials."' Further, as he becomes famil-
iar with the circumstances surrounding the particular collective bargaining re-
lationship, 2 the permanent arbitrator, or umpire or impartial chairman, as
such figures are variously called, will be in a position to eliminate much unnec-
essary investigative detail and opinion preparation, thus shortening the time
required for hearings and thereby reducing costs.53 The use of this form of the
arbitration process, in some industries," since the turn of the century testifies
to its considerable advantages where a mature relationship between labor and
management is involved 5 Unlike the ad hoc arbitrator, a permanent arbitra-
tor is in a position to display and develop a considerable body of knowledge
about labor relations in" the industry where he holds tenure. 56 He will become
familiar not only with the terms of the applicable collective agreement, but
also the body of custom and practice concerned, 57 to the extent that he is in-
deed versed in the "common law" of his particular industry." His tenure in
office will generally be marked by the consistency of his awards 9 since the
disputes referred to him will all be under the same contract; they will thus be
available as a form of precedent to guide the parties in administering their
collective agreement 0 and in the negotiation of future contracts.6 1 The perma-
Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L. J. 916, 930 (1978-79) [hereinafter
cited as Getman].
46 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582.
47 R. COULSON, supra note 38, at 69.
48 H. DAVEY, CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 174-75 (3d ed. 1972).
49 Id. at 175.
30 F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 34, at 74.
51 Id. at 74.
02 W. MAGGIOLO, TECHNIQUES OF MEDIATION IN LABOR DISPUTES 4-5 (1971).
5S F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 34, at 75.
Id. at 73.
05 For an interesting survey of the differing forms of permanent arbitration systems and the
collective relationships behind them, see Killingsworth & Wallen, Constraint and Variety in Arbi-
tration Systems, 1964 PROC. OF THE SEVENTEENTH ANN. MEETING, NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB., 56.
16 W. HOLLEY & K. JENNINGS, supra note 40, at 277.
67 A. SLOANE & F. WITNEY, supra note 36, at 240.
18 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
81 F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 34, at 374-77.
60 M. TRoTTA, HANDLING GRIEVANCES - A GUIDE FOR MANAGEMENT AND LABOR 134-35 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as TRoTTA].
61 E. BEAL, E. WICKERSHAM & P. KIENAST, THE PRACTICE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 418 (5th
ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as E. BEAL, E. WICKERSHAM & P. KIENAST].
(Vol. 85
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nent arbitrator is therefore closer to the Supreme Court's vision of arbitral
competence than is the ad hoc arbitrator; but again it must be stressed that
most arbitration in this country is conducted on an ad hoc basis.82
For the vast majority of labor arbitrators, then, a question mark hangs
over their competence. A random sample conducted by this writer of 100 arbi-
trators who currently list their biographies 3 reveals that 43 percent are
academians,"' 38 percent are lawyers,"' and the remainder come from sundry
backgrounds, including judges, accountants, economists, and ministers;66 and
this survey is consistent with earlier studies.67 Interestingly, 64 percent of
those listed had law degrees,6 8 indicating perhaps that unions and employers
hold this particular credential in high esteem, although it is not a decisive fac-
tor as shown by the fact that of the majority occupation
listed-education-only 10 percent were law p'rofessors.69 The academic back-
ground of many arbitrators points to the inescapable fact that they are not
particularly experienced in the realities of labor relations but rather in their
particular disciplines. When a professor, for example, is called upon to arbi-
trate on an ad hoc basis in many different industries,7 0 how can he possibly
acquire other than a passing acquaintanceship with the array of customs and
practices to which he is exposed.7 1 He does not know these customs and prac-
tices by experience, but instead he is usually referred to them in much the
same manner that a judge takes judicial notice, indeed to such an extent that
this aspect of the arbitrator's function is often termed "arbitral notice. '7 2 The
legal credentials possessed by so many arbitrators would seem to indicate that
unions and employers consider legal acumen more important than knowledge
of background custom and practice," if indeed they consider this alleged back-
:2 M. STONE, supra note 43, at 2.
*' LAB. ARB. AWARDS (CCH) 9501-9806 passim (1981).
*Id.
5 Id.
66 Id.
' See, e.g., Hepburn and Loiseaux, The Nature of the Arbitration Process, 10 VAND. L. REv.
657-660 (1957). See also Herrick, Profile of a Labor Arbitrator, ARE. J. JuN, 1982, AT 18.
68 See supra note 63.
6I Id.
70 "Academic experience or work as a neutral party ... is common, but these backgrounds do
not provide knowledge of the day-to-day realities of labor relations." Getman, supra note 45, at
930.
7, It is likely that an arbitrator will often be faced with problems involving custom and prac-
tice. For example:
If the contract provisions and facts in evidence are unmistakably clear and concise,
the arbitrator will have little difficulty making a decision. The award will sustain the
party whose position is supported by the facts and precise contract language. However,
the majority of grievances that are arbitrated do not involve such clear issues, because
cases which are so easily defined are usually settled through the grievance proce-
dure .... [W]here there is no precise and applicable contract language, the arbitrator is
bound to use the past practice of the parties' experience with the collective bargaining
agreement as the basis for making a determination. (emphasis supplied).
L. BALLIET, SURVEY OF LABOR RELATIONS 160 (1981).
72 F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 34, at 361.
73 P. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATION: A DISSENTING VIEw 58 (1966).
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ground knowledge at all in their deliberations leading to the selection of an
arbitrator. In summary, the means by which labor arbitrators earn their liveli-
hoods 7 4 tell us little about their competence in arbitration; they merely indi-
cate that arbitrators are generally drawn from the ranks of competent people,
which is not quite the same thing.
75
The means by which unions and employers select arbitrators provides an
interesting perspective on the question of competence. The parties are free to
choose whomever they please 76 as labor arbitration in this country is under-
taken on a purely voluntary basis,77 but they generally make their choice from
lists of arbitrators submitted to them by either the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation (AAA), the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), a state
agency charged with this function, 7 or from any other source provided in the
applicable collective agreement.79 These agencies maintain panels of arbitra-
tors who have been rigorously vetted"0 to ensure the best possible choice to the
parties; while this does not necessarily mean that those so empanelled will all
be competent arbitrators it at least raises the probability that this will be so
because all empanelled are competent people.8' When in receipt of a list of
arbitrators from a designated source, labor and management will make a mutu-
ally acceptable choice by striking off names82 until they find one that both
sides are comfortable with.83
Although there exists a large pool of candidates" who are apparently qual-
ified to hear and determine disputes, a small number of arbitrators get a dis-
proportionately large amount of the workload available. This is so because the
most important criterion in selecting an arbitrator, as the parties see it, seems
Insofar as labor arbitration becomes procedurally more formal there may be a tendency to
prefer legally qualified arbitrators over others.
If past arbitrations are to be used as precedents, the parties to a case must be given the
chance to present relevant decisions to the arbitrator. This can best be achieved by writ-
ing briefs, which in turn is made easier by having transcripts made of the hearing. The
use of briefs and transcripts tends to make the hearing more formal; it also tends to
increase the selection of lawyers as arbitrators. (Emphasis supplied.)
Getman, supra note 45, at 921.
74 For an excellent current analysis of the qualifications and competence of labor arbitrators,
see Herrick, Profile of a Labor Arbitrator, ARB. J., June, 1982, at 18.
7 Id. at 21.
71 FLEMING, supra note 7, at 209-10.
7 There is, however, statutory encouragement to enter into voluntary methods of adjust-
ments. See Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976).
78 S. KAGEL, ANATOMY OF A LABOR ARBITRATION 31 (1961).
79 C. UPDEGRAFF & W. McCoy, ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES 66-69 (1961) [hereinafter cited
as L. UPDEGRAFF & W. McCoy].
so D. ROTHSCHILD, L. MERRIFIELD & H. EDWARDS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR ARBITRA-
TION 219-20 (2d ed. 1979).
82 See supra note 67.
82 TROPrA, supra note 60, at 132.
83 R. COULSON, supra note 38, at 32.
84 The AAA was reported as having a 1500-person panel, with only around 450-500 actually
getting cases; while the FMCS reported that 25% of its panel members got 75% of the workload;
see Report by FMCS, AAA on Arbitration Panels, LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK (BNA) 225-26
(1967).
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to be experience in the arbitration process,85 thus creating what one authority
called the "catch-22" ' of labor arbitration; that is, while there is a shortage of
experienced arbitrators,8 7 the inexperienced will not be chosen until they get
experience, something the instant parties all too often seem unwilling to give
them.88 This marked reluctance by unions and employers to introduce "new
blood" into the system has resulted in some predictable inequities. It was esti-
mated that in 1969, for example, 75 percent of the available number of arbitra-
tion cases were heard by only 25 percent of empanelled arbitrators;s the par-
ties sometimes even going so far as to blacklist certain arbitrators that they
were dissatisfied with.9 0 Even on a regional basis the picture remains the same.
In California, for example, over 90 percent of the available caseload was heard
by only 25 percent of those empanelled."'
In 1977 the director of the FMCS stated that the pre-experience require-
ment ensured that while arbitrators under the age of 40 comprised 12 percent
of the roster maintained by his agency they received only 31/2 percent of the
workload. 2 This discernable age bias can be understood in terms of experience
as the parties would be less than human if they lacked apprehension in en-
trusting their problems to inexperienced and untried arbitrators.9 3 However,
another important factor which contributes to the problem is that of low expo-
sure of new talent.9 ' There is, for example, no modern equivalent of the War
Labor Board to give unions and employers a chance to consider the feasibility
of using more arbitrators from the larger pool of competent people available.9"
While many authoritative voices have bemoaned the shortage of skilled arbi-
trators,98 others have stated the problem in terms of an unwillingness on the
85 Study on Criteria in Choosing Arbitrators, 1978 LAB. REL. Y. B. (BNA) 239-40 [hereinafter
cited as Study].
86 Greenbaum, Should Arbitrators Be Certified? 1977 PRoc. OF THE THIRTIETH ANN. MEETING
NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB., 202, 219 (1977).
81 FMCS Annual Report on Arbitration, Mediation Activity, 1971 LAB. REL. Y. B. (BNA) 283.
88 Study, supra note 85, at 240.
Cost, Time, Training Factors in Labor Arbitration, 1969 LAB. REL. Y. B. (BNA) 267.
8o Id. at 270.
Meeting of Committee on Labor Arbitration, 1978 LAB. REL. Y. B. (BNA) 125 [hereinafter
cited as Meetings].
92 FMCS and Problem of New Arbitrators 1977 LAB. REL. Y. B. (BNA) 125.
91 The parties are also usually unwilling to select some arbitrators who have experience; if it is
the wrong kind of experience; see H. DAvEY, supra note 15.
The supply shortage will be a problem for employers and unions for some time to
come. The parties are always looking for new faces - or say they are - but they exhibit
uniform reluctance to pioneer in the trial use of comparatively young and inexperienced
arbitrators. They also rarely accept experienced labor relations prospects as arbitrators if
the experience of the would-be arbitrator was gained on either the management or the
union side of the bargaining table.
This is understandable, regrettable and, in my view, short-sighted.
Id. at 181.
9' Teple, 1976 Report of Committee on Development of Arbitrators, 1976 PROC. OF THE
TWENTY-NINTH ANN. MEETING NAT'L AcAD. OF AR. 327, 329.
95 Larney, Arbitration: The Long and Winding Road, SPIDR NEws, June, 1982, at 5.
See also, Seitz, So You Want To Be An Arbitrator, 27 ARB. J. 179, 182 (1972).
" See, e.g., Davey, Restructuring Grievance Arbitration Procedures: Some Modest Proposals,
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part of labor and management to depart from the tried and true,97 which
makes the problem then not one of shortage but rather of under-utilization of
an ample fund of talent." Concerned arbitrators have for some time been en-
gaged in exercises to bring new faces to the attention of the parties. Intern-
ships, for example, have been used by some permanent arbitrators" in an at-
tempt to introduce inexperienced arbitrators to unions and employers in the
industries concerned. In regard to ad hoc arbitrators, the AAA, FMCS, and
others have been instrumental in mounting several novel and ambitious train-
ing programs, 100 but without any marked degree of success. 101 Empanellment of
arbitrators is one thing; actual utilization of their services is another. Clearly,
many are called but few are chosen. The unfortunate consequence of this phe-
nomenon is that arbitral competence is relegated to second place in favor of
arbitrator acceptability; and the refusal by labor and management to broaden
their search for arbitrators means that the increased probability of discovering
more skilled and able people for determination of the growing number of con-
tractual disputes0" in this country is thereby diminished.
Sometimes the parties further exacerbate the problem by engaging in
"box-scoring." This is a process whereby labor and management undertake a
survey of a number of prior awards of a given arbitrator in the hope of finding
a bias in favor of union or employer,103 depending upon which side is doing the
"scoring."'' 04 Ethical considerations aside, however, there is a basic fallacy in
this crude method of selecting an arbitrator. Simply totalling whether or not
an arbitrator has found in favor of management or labor over a given number
of prior awards does not in and of itself necessarily reveal a bias. As the vast
majority of arbitral awards arise from ad hoc arbitration, 0 5 it follows logically
that they were decided against differing contractual backgrounds and custom-
ary practices;108 much more so than the hurried and cursory box-score can ever
54 IowA L. REv. 560, 561 (1969).
Proposals for Handling Arbitration Problems, 1971 LAB. REL. Y. B. (BNA) 149.
08 Meetings, supra note 91, at 48.
"FMCS Arbitration Services Advisory Committee, 1976 LAB. REL. Y. B. (BNA) 413.
100 For an excellent treatment of such endeavors, see McDermott, Progress Report: Programs
Directed At The Development of New Arbitrators, 1973 PROC. OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH ANN. MET-
ING NAT'L AcAD. OF Aiw. 247-59.
101 Arbitrators may obtain training from a number of sources, but the problem essentially is
one of acceptability; see Reform of Grievance - Arbitration Procedures, 1972 LAB. REL. Y. B.
(BNA) 161.
10I By 1971 it was estimated that the arbitration caseload was approaching 50,000 cases per
year; see Arbitration, the Courts, the Consequences, 1971 LAB. REL. Y. B. (BNA) 72. By 1968 the
FMCS found that its arbitration workload had doubled in only six years, see Report on FMCS
Mediation, Arbitration in Fiscal 1968, 1969 LAB. REL. Y. B. (BNA) 675, and its workload has
increased every year since, see, e.g., Government's Role in Bargaining, Labor Disputes, 1977 LAB.
REL. Y. B. (BNA) 356. Government's Role In Bargaining, Labor Disputes, 1979 LAB. REL. Y. B.
(BNA) 374.
103 E. BEAL, E. WicmKEasHAM, & P. KiENAST, supra note 61, at 415.
104 H. DAvEY, supra note 48, at 167-68.
100 W. HOLLEY & K. JENNINGS, supra note 40.
100 M. STONE, supra note 43, at 288.
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reveal. 10 7 As prior awards are involved, it must further be stressed that such
methods may serve to militate against selecting arbitrators who already have
experience, thereby diminishing a pool of available competence which is al-
ready too small. While the labor arbitration community at large finds that
most arbitrators are not influenced by box-scoring,108 it undoubtedly provides a
none too subtle pressure, whatever the response to it of each arbitrator, to
sway decisions on the basis of past awards to the extent that the literature of
labor arbitration sometimes contains allegations of favoritism to one side or
another,109 and of "splitting" awards between unions and employers in the
hope of demonstrating an apparent objectivity.110 As labor arbitration is an
adversarial process,11 the manifest desire to win is perhaps understandable on
the part of both parties, but it seems trite and contradictory for unions and
employers using such methods of selection to demand lists of arbitrators se-
lected for empanelling, among other factors, on the basis of their impartiality
and integrity.1 2 Where box-scoring is used, the prestige of arbitral competence
is accordingly debased to such a degree that the president of the AAA has
likened this method of selection to choosing a race horse on which to bet."1 '
Judge Paul R. Hays is probably the most famous critic of the labor arbi-
tration process and of the competence of labor arbitrators. His trenchant criti-
cism1 4 is accorded more respect and consideration than most because he was
himself a labor arbitrator of some years standing.1 5 He stated that the Su-
preme Court had no basis in fact for assuming that arbitrators had a knowl-
edge of the realities of collective bargaining superior to that of judges, 16 its
rationale coming at a time when little labor arbitration literature was availa-
ble.117 He noted that judges could be informed of the customs and practices
107 Formula for Winning Labor Arbitration Cases, 1967 LAB. REL. Y. B. (BNA) 65.
"The numbers game and a search of the won-lost record is purposeless. The essential consider-
ation is the intelligence, integrity, and experience of the arbitrator."
108 Davey, How Arbitrators Decide Cases, 27 ARB. J. 274, 282-83 (1972).
"19 See, e.g., Eaton, Labor Arbitration in the San Francisco Bay Area, 22 ARB. J. 93, 95
(1967). See also Kleiman, The Impact of Acceptability On The Arbitrator, PROC. OF THE TWENTY-
FIRST ANN. MEETING NAT'L AcAD. OF ARB. 112, 115 (1968).
110 Killingsworth, Twenty-Five Years of Labor Arbitraton - And The Future, 1972 PROC. OF
THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANN. MEETING NAT'L AcAD. OF ARB., 11, 14 (1972) [HEREINAFTER CITED As K%-
LINGSWORTH]. See also Cole, The Status and Expendability Of The Labor Arbitrator, 1957 SE-
LECTED PAPERS FROM THE FIRST SEVEN ANN. MEETINGS OF THE NAT'L AcAD. OF ARB. 1948-1954, 42,
48.
II For an entertaining and instructive treatment of this feature of the arbitration process, see
Gill, Gamesmanship In Labor Arbitration, 1962 Psoc. OF THE FIFTEENTH ANN. MEETING NAT'L
AcAD. OF ARB. 148. See also Garrett, The Role of Lawyers In Arbitration, 1961 PROC. OF THE
FOURTEENTH ANN. MEETING NAT'L AcAD. OF ARB. 102, 106-107 [hereinafter cited as Garrett].
12 Ryder, The Impact of Acceptability On The Arbitrator, 1968 PROC. OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
ANN. MEETING NAT'L AcAD. OF ARB. 94, 98-100.
113 Coulson, Criticisms of Grievance Arbitration, 1980 LAB. REL. Y. B. (BNA) 137, 139.
114 P. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATION: A DISSENTING VIEW (1966) [hereinafter cited as P. HAYs].
15 Judge Hays was formerly a member of the law faculty of Columbia University. He was an
arbitrator for twenty-three years before joining the federal bench in 1961.
6 P. HAYS, supra note 114, at 38.
11 There is a surprising lack of factual studies of the arbitration process. Yet if we are to
understand what the system really is and how it actually works in practice such studies
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that lie behind the wording of a collective agreement in the same way that
arbitrators are, namely by being told of them.118 Observing that the Court's
generous allocation of jurisdiction upon labor arbitrators seemed to be predi-
cated on the basis of their superior skills, he again emphasized that there were
no extensive studies in this area to support this contention.119 He claimed that
if there were any identifiable skills necessary for arbitrators they were legal
ones, 12 and compared the expertise required of labor arbitrators to that of a
judge deciding a case in contract law; 2 ' going on to say of the typical
arbitrator:
For his task he requires exactly the same expertise which judges have and use
every day. He must be expert in analyzing issues, in weighing evidence, and in
contract interpretation.
There are only a handful of arbitrators who . .. have the knowledge,
training, skill, and character to make them good judges and therefore good
arbitrators. In literally thousands of cases every year, decisions are made by
arbitrators who are wholly unfitted for their jobs-who do not have the requi-
site knowledge, training, skill, intelligence, and character. 2
Judge Hays drove home his charges by alleging that an indeterminate number
of arbitral awards were made each year by arbitrators who were primarily mo-
tivated by a desire to be rehired by the parties. 23 While admitting that the
number so decided could not be quantitatively estimated, he nonetheless
claimed that a system which gives rise to this is per se undesirable.1 24
The labor arbitration community, as was to be expected, issued many re-
buttals to this biting criticism of the learned Judge, some of them quite
thoughtful and considered. 125 Leaving aside his assertions concerning the sta-
are vital.... For whatever reason, there are few studies of the arbitration process writ-
ten by its clients. Our knowledge of the subject would be considerably enhanced by frank
and thoughtful studies of this kind.
Id.
11 Id. at 47-48.
'9 [T]here is no authority to support the view of arbitration adopted in the Steelworkers
cases. There have been no extensive studies of the arbitration process that would estab-
lish the validity of the propositions advanced in those cases. While, with overwhelming
modesty, the Court attributed to the arbitrators enormously superior expertise in cases
arising under collective agreements, the Court impliedly claimed for itself an extensive
knowledge and understanding of the arbitration process - a knowledge and understand-
ing which the Court could hardly have in the light of the available material on
arbitration.
Id. at 9.
120 Id. at 58.
121 Id. at 42.
122 Id. at 112.
123 Id.
124 Id.
225 Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law, And Labor Arbitration, 1967 PROC. OF THE
TWENTIETH ANN. MEETING NAT'L AcAD. OF ARB. 1. "His [Hays'] charges generally suffer from a
painful lack of documentation, and when he reaches for evidence, his methods are distorted by a
passion for denunciation. In short, he has substituted for the Supreme Court's mythology of arbi-
tral excellence a new mythology of arbitral corruption and incompetence." Id. at 2. See also Aaron,
Book Review, 42 WASH. L. REv. 976 (1966-67). (Professor Aaron's view of Judge Hays' book).
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tus of labor arbitration and the alleged venality of some arbitrators, however,
his comments concerning the expertise necessary for a labor arbitrator to suc-
cessfully determine disputed contractual claims by labor and management are
instructive. Most practitioners and many authoritative commentators12 would
probably agree that the skills required of an arbitrator are judicial in nature, 127
and in fact, some members of the judiciary have found similarities between the
contract interpretation techniques demanded of an arbitrator and those em-
ployed by judges,128 noting also the growth and development in arbitration
procedures of other legal concepts familiar to the judiciary; for example, con-
siderations of due process. 129 Given these estimations of the skills required of a
labor arbitrator it would therefore seem appropriate to cautiously contend
that, as so many arbitrators are in possession of legal credentials, 130 they are
probably largely competent to undertake the task of determining capably the
disputes referred to them in the grievance arbitration system.'3 '
Whether or not the Supreme Court's initial appraisal of arbitrator per-
formance was accurate, it did lead to judicial deferral to the awards of labor
arbitrators; and indeed it was understood by arbitration scholars as being more
of a conferral of jurisdiction upon arbitrators than a correct summary of their
skills.132 Thus a party which is dissatisfied with an award will not be able to
obtain judicial review of it except on very specific grounds. 11" In Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co.,"' the Supreme Court refused to defer to a prior arbitral
award because a possible breach of Title VII was also involved. In so doing,
however, the Court noted that the specialized competence of labor arbitrators
lay in the law of the shop as opposed to the law of the land.13 5 While the
Supreme Court in the 1960 Steelworkers' Trilogy was seeking to confer juris-
diction upon labor arbitrators, the Gardner-Denver Court in 1974 was seeking
The flaws of the system upon which he delights to dwell - incompetent and corrupt arbi-
trators; collusive arrangements between labor and management designed to hoodwink
innocent workers; excessive delays; outrageous costs - are individually and collectively so
reprehensible that one is compelled to wonder how professor-arbitrator Hays permitted
himself to participate actively in this sordid process for twenty-three years.
Id. at 976-77.
120 Most of these persons while castigating his views of the process and of arbitrators, do not
dispute the assessment of Judge Hays concerning the nature of the skills required in determining
grievance disputes.
127 Aaron, Labor Arbitration and Its Critics, 10 LAB. L. J. 605, 606 (1959). See also Garrett,
supra note 111, at 114-115.
12 See, e.g., Tobriner, An Appellate Judge's View Of The Labor Arbitration Process; Due
Process And The Arbitration Process, 1967 PROC. OF THE TWENTIETH ANN. MEETING NAT'L AcAD.
OF ARB. 37 [hereinafter cited as Torbriner].
12, Id. at 41-45.
120 See supra note 63.
131 Tobriner, supra note 128, at 46.
132 Aaron, Arbitration In The Federal Courts: Aftermath Of the Trilogy, 1962 PROC. OF THE
FIFTEENTH ANN. MEETING NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. 60, 61-62.
123 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
See also Rothstein, Vacation of Awards for Fraud, Bias, Misconduct and Partiality, 10 VAND.
L. REV. 813 (1956-57).
124 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
s25 Id. at 57.
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to restrict it. But both rationales contained utterances concerning the special-
ized competence of labor arbitrators; the difference with the Gardner-Denver
pronouncement being that it came after a long period of time during which
much study and research into labor arbitration had been undertaken.
The years since the Steelworkers' Trilogy have indeed witnessed a vast
increase in the total knowledge available concerning labor arbitration. A large
number of awards are published annually,136 for the guidance of all involved in
the system; 37 or in studying it. Each year, also, the most prestigious profes-
sional body in the field-the National Academy of Arbitrators-holds its An-
nual Convention during which some of the leading figures in arbitration pre-
sent papers on various aspects of the process; these and other contributions are
accordingly published as Proceedings of the National Academy, making them
available to -the entire arbitration community.13s Bodies such as the AAA and
the FMCS additionally contribute many publications139 and much important
research has been conducted in the area. 40 Add to all of this the work of arbi-
tration scholars' 4 ' and it can be readily appreciated that there exists in the
United States a considerable body of knowledge about labor arbitration. While
competence in the field does not of itself make an arbitrator acceptable to the
parties, the extensive growth and development of arbitration research and
literature does mean that those selected to determine contract administration
"3 These awards are published by organizations such as the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA)
and the Commerce Clearing House (CCH).
'37 Not all awards are published; in fact only a small percentage appear in print. See Alexan-
der, Evaluation Of Arbitrators: An Arbitrator's Point of View, 1958 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEV-
ENTH ANN. MEEN NAT'L AcAD. OF ARB. 93, 97.
2" The Academy was founded in 1948 and it has held annual conventions since then, the
proceedings of which are published by the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA).
139 The AAA has, for example, since 1959 published a monthly summary of Labor Arbitration
Awards.
40 See, e.g., Warren & Bernstein, A Profile of Labor Arbitration, 16 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 970
(1951); Procedural Aspects of Labor-Management Arbitration, 28 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 933 (1957);
Basic Patterns in Labor Arbitration Agreements, 34 LAB. ARB. (BNA) 931 (1961); Edwards, Due
Process Considerations in Labor Arbitration, 25 Ann. J. 141 (1970); Rosser, Deference of Jurisdic-
tion by the National Labor Relations Board and the Arbitration Clause, 25 VAND. L. REV. 1057
(1972); Jennings & Wolters, Discharge Cases Reconsidered, 31 ARB. J. 164 (1976); Gross &
Bordoni, Reflections On The Arbitrator's Responsibility To Provide A Full And Fair Hearing:
How to Bite The Hands That Feed You, 29 SYRAcusE L. REV. 877 (1978); Lawson, Arbitrator
Acceptability: Factors Affecting Selection, 36(4) ARE. J. 22 (1981); Fogel, Court Review of Dis-
charge Arbitration Awards, 37(2) Ann. J. 22 (1982). The foregoing is offered as an indication of the
extent and diversity of labor arbitration scholarship in dealing with various aspects of the labor
arbitration process and some of the challenges with which it has been presented from time to time.
M The work of arbitration scholars has indeed increased in extent and quality since the time
of the Steelworker's Trilogy, but Professor Aaron, in his critique of Judge Hays claimed that there
was, in fact, a large body of arbitration literature prior to the Steelworkers, saying:
Judge Hays appears not to have made even the most cursory review of the literature of
labor arbitration. Descriptive and statistical studies, as well as critical articles, abound,
and some of the most outspoken attacks on both the system of labor arbitration and on
arbitrators themselves by their 'clients' have been published in the Annual Proceedings
of the National Academy of Arbitrators.
Aaron, Book Review, 42 WASH. L. REV. 976, 978 (1966-67).
[Vol. 85
16
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 5 [1983], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol85/iss5/5
LABOR ARBITRATORS
disputes have a definable body of arbitration lore to call upon;142 certainly
much more than in 1960 when the Steelworkers' Trilogy gave labor arbitration
its prestigious place in American collective bargaining. While it may be debata-
ble whether arbitrators have knowledge and experience which a judge does not
possess of the realities of collective bargaining, it is probably true to say that
they now have specialized competence in the subject matter of labor arbitra-
tion which a judge is unlikely to possess.
II. THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS
In Gardner-Denver the Supreme Court expressed a certain caution in rela-
tion to the total system wherein arbitrators exercise their professional skills; its
opinion being that the informal nature of labor arbitration militated against
the rigor deemed necessary for adequate protection of minority rights in the
employment relationship. 143 In noting that an employee does not waive Title
VII rights merely by resorting to arbitration,4 the Court went on to state that
these rights could not be waived prospectively. 45 Rejection of such a waiver
was based on the premise that collective bargaining rights were markedly dif-
ferent from the individual rights protected under the Title. Collective bargain-
ing rights, for example, even those conferred by statute,1 46 could be either ad-
hered to by the union in its capacity as collective bargaining agent or
relinquished as part of the bargaining process in order to obtain benefits for its
members.1 47 The Court was seeking to ensure that Title VII rights could not be
waived as part of a process of bargaining which had as its objective the further-
ance of majority rights as opposed to the purely individual ones protected by
the Title.1 48 The election of remedies doctrine was found inapplicable as the
rights conferred under the collective agreement and those conferred under Ti-
tle VII were from two different sources.1 49 An increasing number of collective
agreements have provisions prohibiting employment discrimination,150 which
142 See Killingsworth, supra note 110.
Over the past quarter-century, we have amassed a substantial body of literature in our
field. There is unevenness and there are still gaps, but the body of industrial jurispru-
dence continues to grow and even to change. Given the relatively brief time-span in-
volved it is a remarkable collective achievement. This body of literature, articulating
commonly accepted principles, now supports our claim to the status of a profession.
Id. at 20.
See also Haughton, Future Directions For Labor Arbitration And For The National Academy
of Arbitrators, 1977 PRoc. OF THE THIRTIETH ANN. MEETING NAT'L AcAD. OF ARB. 243, 256-57.
143 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56-58.
144 Id. at 52.
145 Id. at 51.
1' The right to strike, for example, is given by virtue of § 13 of the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 163(1976), but it can be waived as part of the give and take of bargaining. "Plainly
the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike."
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455.
147 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51.
148 "Title VII, on the other hand, stands on plainly different ground; it concerns not
majoritarian processes, but an individual's right to equal employment opportunities." Id.
1l Id. at 49-51.
150 Coulson, Black Alice In Gardner - Denverland, 1974 PRoC. OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH ANN.
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would mean that such matters could go to arbitration as a breach of the appli-
cable contract. The Court, however, refused to defer to an arbitral award made
even under these circumstances. Its objection was based on the inappropriate-
ness of the arbitration process itself as a means of adjudicating such grievances
adequately. 51
A brief survey of the nature and mechanics of the labor arbitration process
may serve to illustrate the Court's concern with entrusting the important pub-
lic policy issues involved in Title VII to a forum which is privately established
and financed for purposes of grievance adjustment between labor and manage-
ment."5 As a means of resolving contractual disputes between unions and em-
ployers, arbitration is usually preferred to court enforcement because it is
widely regarded as being faster, less expensive, and less formal than the legal
process. 153 But the informality of arbitration in relation to court procedure was
the very feature of the process that the Court found undesirable where minor-
ity rights were involved.
5 4
The parties may initiate arbitration by means of a submission agree-
ment " " or, more commonly, a demand or notice by either side invoking the
applicable arbitration clause of their collective agreement. Once they have se-
lected a qualified and mutually acceptable arbitrator, 56 the person chosen will
normally arrange, with the help of the agency which forwarded his name to the
parties, 5 7 a date on which the hearing will be held. At the commencement of
the hearing the parties may stipulate the issue to be determined; if they are
unable to do so with accuracy, the arbitrator will normally formulate the is-
sue. 58 The arbitrator may then discuss with the parties and their representa-
tives the procedure to be followed. Sometimes this is outlined in the arbitra-
tion clause of the contract, or contained in the rules of the administering
agency utilized by the union and employer.1'5 Where this is not the case, the
arbitrator often determines what procedure is to be employed; 60 the Supreme
Court itself has stated that procedural questions which arise from a dispute
MEETING NAT'L AcAD. OF AR. 236, 237.
'" "Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make arbi-
tration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created by Title VII."
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56.
152 Zack, Suggested New Approaches To Grievance Arbitration, 1977 Pnoc. OF TE THIRTIETH
ANN. MEETING NAT'L AcAD. OF ARB. 105, 106.
1" Feinsinger, Collective Bargaining, Labor Arbitration And The Lawyer, 10 VAND. L. REV.
761, 767 (1956-57).
I" "Indeed it is the informality of arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an efficient,
inexpensive, and expeditious means for dispute resolution. This same characteristic, however,
makes arbitration a less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than the federal
courts." Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 58.
C. UPDEGHAFF & W. McCoy, supra note 79, at 84-85.
5 Friedin, The Status And Expendability Of The Labor Arbitrator, 1957 SELECTED PAPERS
FROM THE FMrST SEVEN ANN. MEMNoS OF THE NAT'L AcAD. OF ARB. 42, 51-52.
' C. UPDEGHAFF & W. McCoy, supra note 79.
18 F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 34, at 188-90.
'9 See R. COULSON, supra note 38, at 97-104.
160 F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 34, at 182.
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LABOR ARBITRATORS
and bear on its final disposition are matters for the arbitrator.""1
There is no set order of presentation in labor arbitration. The arbitrator's
discretion being paramount in this respect, he is charged usually with ensuring
that the order of presentation is such that the facts of the case can be devel-
oped in an orderly manner. 16 2 The charging party will often make the opening
statement, to be followed by the opening statement of the defending party.16 3
Each side may then produce evidence and witnesses, and cross-examination
will be permitted.16 4 At the close of the hearing, each side will be given the
opportunity to make concluding statements and they may produce briefs for
submission to the arbitrator summarizing their respective positions and their
principal arguments, buttressed sometimes by supporting prior arbitral
awards.16 5 The parties then await what will hopefully be a prompt compilation
of the arbitrator's award in the near future, although there is increasing com-
plaint of the tardiness of some arbitrators in this important respect. 66 Theo-
retically an arbitrator is not required to give an opinion with his award,16 7 but
in practice the parties often require this in order to obtain the reasoning on
which the award is based, for purposes of guidance in the event of similar dis-
putes occurring in the future and as a benchmark for the amendment of the
wording of their collective agreement when contract negotiatons come around
next.6 8 The foregoing is an attempt to describe a typical arbitration session.
Actual practice may vary from one set of circumstances to another, but even
this cautious summary may serve to show the importance of arbitrator compe-
tence in two important respects which may prove crucial in the resolution of a
grievance arbitration dispute, namely, the procedure adopted and the order of
presentation.
The arbitrator's essential task is to balance fairness to the parties with the
requirements of procedural efficiency.'69 The delicacy with which this responsi-
bility must be handled is best illustrated by describing evidence admission in
arbitration. Admission is at the discretion of the arbitrator but it is generally
understood that he will admit all relevant evidence and weigh it "for what it is
worth.1' 7 0 To the consternation of the trained lawyer, this extends even to
hearsay and affidavit evidence. 1 ' The basic differences in function of an arbi-
161 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
162 Aaron, Some Procedural Problems in Arbitration, 10 VAND. L. REv., 733, 739 (1956-57)
[hereinafter cited as Aaron].
163 Id. at 739.
164 Id. at 745.
65 W. HOLLEY & K. JENNINGS, supra note 40, at 281, 289.
16 FMCS Arbitration Services Advisory Committee Meeting. 1976 LAB. REL. Y. B. (BNA) 412
(1976). See also Killingsworth, supra note 110, at 24.
167 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960).
166 E. BEAL, E. WICKERSHAM, & P. KiENAsT, supra note 61, at 418.
166 Fleming, Problems of Procedural Regularity in Labor Arbitration, 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 221.
170 Jones & Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the Arbitration Pro-
cess: A Report With Comments, 62 MICH. L. REv. 1115, 1127-30 (1963-64).
171 Straus, Labor Arbitration and Its Critics, 20 ARB. J. Journal, 197 (1965):
'I'll Accept it For What it is Worth.' If there is one expression on the part of an arbitra-
tor best calculated to get an attorney's supply of milltown out on the table, this is it.
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tration tribunal and a court of law make the less rigorous stance of the arbitra-
tor comprehensible. There is no jury in labor arbitration, and the need for cau-
tion in the admission of evidence is therefore not as great as in a court of
law. 1 72 In addition, an arbitral award may be subsequently overthrown by a
court on grounds of failure to hear material evidence;173 but requiring arbitra-
tors to be expert in, for example, the complexities of the hearsay rule 17 4 would
mean that a layman could not adequately conduct an arbitration hearing. The
Supreme Court also noted that arbitration may have a therapeutic effect on
the parties involved, 175 and arbitrators generally interpret this to mean that
they should give the union and management representatives the opportunity to
get things off their chest, 76 even when it includes material and testimony
which would not be permitted in a court of law. It is not hard to appreciate
that the relaxed stance of labor arbitrators in this regard would probably prove
disturbing to an employee alleging employment discrimination as well as a
breach of the collective agreement.
The difficulty involved in ascertaining to what degree a particular arbitra-
tor adhered to, or detracted from, the rules of evidence is further exacerbated
by the fact that in most arbitration proceedings an adequate record is not
kept. Sometimes a written transcript will be used and sometimes the proceed-
ings will be tape recorded.17 7 Written transcripts are not employed in the ma-
jority of arbitration hearings,'78 but their use is on the increase. 79 They may
prove useful in long and complicated proceedings, and are often undertaken
where the subject matter is highly technical. Arbitrators are sometimes partial
Many attorneys, trained as they are for the formal rules to be found in the courts, find
traumatic the infomality and permissiveness of the arbitration hearing room. Even some
of the most experienced advocates from the ranks of both labor and management feel
unhappy when an arbitrator agrees to accept certain kinds of evidence which a court of
law might reject as irrelevant.
Id. at 202.
... M. SCHEINMAN, EVIDENCE & PROOF IN ARBITRATION 6-7 (1977).
173 Id. at 7.
14 See generally, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1972).
"I5 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
178 DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION PROC. OF THE TwENTY-FIRST ANN.
MEETING NAT'L AcAD. OF AR. 125, 127 (1968).
Consider the time-honored stance of the late Dean Shulman. The more serious dan-
ger is not that the arbitrator will hear too much irrelevancy, but rather that he will not
hear enough of the relevant. Indeed, one advantage frequently reaped from wide latitude
to the parties to talk about their case is that the apparent rambling frequently discloses
very helpful information which would otherwise not be brought out.
Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REv. 999, 1017 (1955).
17 For a succinct account of the ways in which an arbitration proceeding may be recorded, see
Jaffee, Battle Report: The Problem of Stenographic Records in Arbitration, 20 ARD. J. 97 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Jaffee].
"1 Labor Arbitration-Perspectives And Problems, 1964 PROC. OF THE SEVENTEENTH ANN.
MEETING NAT'L AcAD. OF AR. 82, 96.
170 See, e.g., 1981 34TH ANN. REP. FED. MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SER. 38, Table 18:
Cases closed Transcripts taken Not taken Other
1977 5,729 (100%) 1,365 (23.8%) 4,130 (72.1%) 234 (4.1%)
1981 6,967 (100%) 2,044 (29.3%) 4,610 (66.2%) 313 (4.5%)
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to them because they eliminate the need for much unnecessary note taking,
thereby permitting better concentration on the facts and issues presented,18 0
and they may be instrumental in salvaging an award in the event of subse-
quent court review.181 Where written transcripts are undertaken they some-
times tend to make the parties exercise more care in the presentation of evi-
dence and testimony because of the verbatim and permanent nature of this
method of recording the proceedings.1 82 On first inspection, then, the utiliza-
tion of a transcript would seem to go some way to meeting the Supreme
Court's requirement of an adequate record of the proceedings, 183 and the in-
crease in their use would seem encouraging to proponents of Title VII protec-
tions. However, labor arbitration commentators do not welcome this increase
and it is often criticized on several grounds. Written transcripts are said, for
example, to bring an unwelcome delay in the rendering of an award because an
arbitrator will have to devote time to reading it, and the parties involved may
be lured into unnecessary rhetoric and formality.8 Thus the relative informal-
ity on which labor arbitration is based tends to militate against meeting even
this most rudimentary of the Gardner-Denver requirements for according
weight to an arbitral award.
The informal nature of labor arbitration proceedings would seem, on first
inspection,'to make the task of the arbitrator a relatively easy one. Closer anal-
ysis, however, indicates that this basic feature of the process places instead a
crucial responsibility upon arbitrators to dispatch their function competently.
Unaided by the sophisticated techniques of the courtroom he must somehow
provide a full and fair hearing in a process that, if skill and vigilance were not
exercised, could conceivably degenerate into anarchy.85 Much depends upon
the ability with which the arbitrator handles the competing interests involved.
He can make sense (or alternatively nonsense) out of the proceedings at such
crucial points as defining the issue or issues before him,1 8  establishing the pro-
150 The Arbitrator, the NLRB, and the Courts, 1967 PROC. OF THE TWENTIETH ANN. MEETING
NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. 331, 332.
181 Jaffee, supra note 177, at 98.
'82 Roberts, How To Get Better Results From Labor-Management Arbitration, 22 APB. J. 1, 4
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Roberts].
183 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57, 60.
184 However, in the run-of-the mill case, economy and efficiency are not served by having
a transcript. With a transcript being taken, there is a tendency to use it as an opportu-
nity for rhetoric. On occasion it appears that the speaker is addressing some other audi-
ence that may be looking over his shoulder. These aberrations tend to prolong the hear-
ing. The stenographic record also encourages an unnecessary formality which consciously
or unconsciously is a reaction to the knowledge that what is being said will appear later
in printed form. It may change the entire personality of the hearing.
Finally, there is a delay in receiving the record and in the submission of any briefs.
The award similarly will be delayed.
Roberts, supra note 182 at 4, 5.
181 For an instructive treatment of this crucial function of the arbitrator see Jaffee, The Arbi-
traton Hearing - Avoiding A Shambles: A Panel Discussion, 1965 PROC. OF THE EIGHTEENTH ANN.
MEETING NAT'L AcAD. OF ARB. 75.
188 F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 158.
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cedure to be followed, 187 and controlling the order of presentation of the evi-
dence and testimony proferred. In this respect his overall task has been de-
scribed as one of building into the proceedings an "ordered informality."'' 88
An illustration of the interpersonal or human relations skills which this
requires is provided by what is sometimes termed the "political" arbitration
case; that is, there is no compelling question of contract interpretation in-
volved but one or other of the parties wants its day in court if only to save
face. 89 In these circumstances an arbitrator who insisted on strict constuction
of the applicable contract would be contributing to poor industrial relations in
the company or undertaking concerned. 90
While maintaining informality an arbitrator must nevertheless be in con-
trol of the hearing. Critics of the process sometimes blame arbitrators for relin-
quishing the necessary control to the parties or their representatives.' Where,
for example, the union and employer use attorneys to represent them,9 2 infor-
mality may be severely strained, especially where the arbitrator is not a lawyer
himself. It is perhaps understandable that a lawyer, when faced with the seem-
ingly amorphous nature of arbitration proceedings, may be tempted to rely on
tried and true courtroom techniques to bring order out of apparent chaos, and
the fact that some overstep the mark in this respect is attested to by the
mounting criticism of lawyers as bringing an undesirable legalism into the pro-
cess. 113 Even when the services of an attorney are not used, the parties them-
selves may tax the skills of an arbitrator by behaving in a legalistic way'9' or
" Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration, 1958 PROC. OF THE ELEVENTH ANN. MEETING NAT'L
AcAD. OF ARB. 1, 34-34.
lag Jaffee, supra note 185, at 82. See also Aaron, supra note 162. "It does not follow, however,
that because the arbitration procedure is informal, it must also be anarchic or disorderly. Certain
practices, based on common sense and simple courtesy, are observed in most cases." Id. at 748.
189 Eaton, Labor Arbitration In The San Francisco Bay Area, 22 Arb. J. 93, 95 (1967).
19' Many of the comments upon the arbitration process appear to assume a judicial
model. Take, in particular, the remarks concerning "face-saving" cases. Even those who
approve of their use often do so with reluctance. In some way this.kind of case does not
square with the concept of what a proper hearing should be, and what other than the
judicial trial can furnish the standard which is violated? This is an excellent example of
problems which can arise when the collective bargaining process is crossed with the judi-
cial process. The resultant beast is neither, and difficulties appear when we try to apply
standards from one or the other to the new animal. While there are many guidelines in
arbitration hearings, there are also many areas of discretion, and the final responsibility
for adjusting the business rests in only one place, upon the arbitrator.
Id. at 111-12.
For an interesting discussion of whether an arbitrator should be an "adjudicator" or a "labor rela-
tions physician", see Fuller, Collective Bargaining And The Arbitrator, 1962 PROC. OF THE FIF-
TEENTH ANN. MEETING NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. 8.
19 Jaffee, It's Your Money! Cutting the Cost of Labor Arbitration, 26 ARB. J. 161, 169 (1971).
12 See Garrett, supra note 111.
Mos See, e.g., Subversion of Arbitration by Legalistic Approach, 1979 LAB. REL.Y. B. (BNA)
115-16.
19 Aaron, Labor Arbitration And Its Critics, 10 Lab. L. J. 605 (1959.
[N]o one is so legalistic as a layman imitating a lawyer. Some of the wildest irrelevancies,
most frustrating procedural roadblocks or detours and most.patently unfounded objec-
tions I have ever encountered in an arbitration proceeding were prefaced by the fateful
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indulging in a form of gamesmanship 95 to win their case. The continued popu-
larity of labor arbitration would seem to illustrate that, at least in the percep-
tions of unions and employers, the typical arbitrator is competent at blending
the minimal legal techniques required to bring some order into the proceedings
while preserving the informality which the parties theoretically demand with
the human relations skills necessary to maintain control of the hearing.
In the collective bargaining process, the parties usually conclude their ne-
gotiations with an agreement which establishes the terms of their relationship
for a period of definite duration, ranging from one to three years. "" Collective
bargaining may therefore be considered as a method whereby the union and
employer establish rules and regulations which arise from joint determination
of the basis of their working relationship. 97 When an employee alleges a
breach of the end product of this means of joint determination (i.e., the collec-
tive agreement) it may be taken by the union all the way through a grievance
procedure to arbitration. But while the individual worker concerned may be
claiming that the action complained of was a violation by the company of an
obligation owed to the worker personally, his ground of action, and also his
right to process it, arises from the individual application of a collective provi-
sion in the contract.198 The terms of a collective agreement are rarely consid-
ered by the parties to be cast in stone. In the mature collective situation, the
parties normally conceive their relationship as being fluid and dynamic in na-
ture.19 9 Behind the strict wording of the terms of their collective agreement
may lie a considerable background of custom and practice 00 which could make
a purely legal application of collective provisions unworkable in the real world
words: Of course, Mr. Arbitrator, I'm not a lawyer, but...
Id. at 607.
195 See Gill, supra note 111.
'" Trend Toward the Three Year Bargain, 1969 LAB. REL. Y. B. (BNA) 81-82.
197 There are many good working definitions of the term "collective bargaining." This writer
prefers that of Professor Hugh Clegg in THE SYSTEM OF INDusTRIAL RELATIONS IN GREAT BRrrAIN
(1972).
It is widely supposed that in the early days of industrialization factories, mines, railways
and offices were run by autocratic managers whose word was a law. This is generally
called employer regulation. When a union (or unions) establishes a foothold some of the
rules may be made by agreement between manager and unions, with joint arrangements
for revision and interpretation. This is called collective bargaining, or sometimes bilat-
eral or joint regulation in contrast to the unilateral regulation of managers acting on
their own. (emphasis as in original).
Id. at 1.
198 J. I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
We are not called upon to say that under no circumstances can an individual enforce an
agreement more advantageous than a collective agreement, but we find the mere possi-
bility that such agreements might be made no ground for holding generally that individ-
ual contracts may survive or surmount collective ones. The practice and philosophy of
collective bargaining looks with suspicion on such individual advantages.
Id. at 338.
199 M. EsTEY, THE UNIONS, 73-74 (1967).
2o Mittenthal, Past Practice And The Administration of Collective Bargaining Agreements,
1961 PRoc. OF THE FOURTEENTH ANN. MEETING NAT'L AcAD. OF ARn. 30, 37.
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of labor relations.20 1 In the absence of an arbitration clause in their contract,
one party could compel the appearance of the other in a court under the bare
wording of section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act.202 However, resort to legal
action in a court must eventually produce a winner and a loser; and while the
contestants before a legal tribunal may never meet again, the participants in
the collective bargaining process must get together the very next day in the
working environment. 03
In place of involuntary compulsion, many unions and employers have
opted instead for their own form of self-government, the grievance adjustment
system which concludes in voluntary and binding arbitration.20' Although the
traditional legal techniques and procedures are accordingly only available in a
minimal form before the arbitration tribunal, the parties submit their disputes
to it in order to preserve the essentially flexible nature of their collective rela-
tionship. As they are thereby attempting to avoid the strict legal application of
their contractual provisions, the parties, whether expressly or impliedly, are
placing a premium on informality. The indivdual appearing before an arbitra-
tor is therefore not accorded the benefits of the traditional protections availa-
ble in a court of law, but most unions can perhaps justifiably claim an exper-
tise in processing a grievance which has its origins in a term of the collective
agreement, 200 having the necessary experience and resources to do so. 200 This is
not necessarily a comfort to the employee who also alleges employment dis-
crimination, as the competence of a union, even with benefit of an attorney,
201 Wallen, The Silent Contract vs. Express Working Conditions: The Arbitration of Local
Working Conditions, PROC. OF THE FIFTEENTH ANN. MEETING NAT'L AcAD. OF ARi. 117, 121. The
use of past practice to clarify what is ambiguous and to give substance to a contract's generalities
is too commonplace to require discussion. The norms of conduct laid down by the parties them-
selves are employed to establish their intent under contract language that can be read several ways
or that is vague or unclear because it is broadly written. The presence or absence of a past practice
clause would scarely serve to alter the use of past practice for this purpose.
2 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) ]] 301(a), 29 USC § 185(a) (1976).
203 Aaron, On First Looking Into The Lincoln Mills Decision, 1959 PRoc. OF THE TWELFTH
ANN. MEETING NAT'L ACAD. OF ARE. 1, 13. Educating the courts in the philosophy of arbitration
and passing laws to prevent them from interfering unduly in its process has become necessary only
to the extent that some employers and unions have traded their priceless opportunity to govern
themselves under private laws of their own making for the illusory advantages of winning an occa-
sional argument by resorting to litigation.
204 G. BLOOM & H. NOITHRUP, ECONOMICS OF LABOR RELATIONS 134 (9th ed. 1981). The griev-
ance procedure is in fact more than a process which provides for the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes arising out of contract interpretations. It is also a mechanism through which misunderstand-
ings can be straightened out and problems solved. It permits representatives of management and
labor to meet regularly and to obtain greater understanding of each other's problems.
2I Id. at 138-39. Grievances are important to the union leadership-they afford an opportu-
nity to gain the workers' loyalty and support by effectively arguing workers' causes with manage-
ment in the many disputes which are processed through the grievance machinery. Furthermore,
operation of the grievance machinery provides opportunities for thousands of workers to serve as
union stewards and committeepersons and thus to gain familiarity with the process of collective
bargaining. Several hundred thousand union members now serve in these minor positions. By par-
ticipating in the grievance machinery, these workers are training themselves for future union
leadership.
206 W. HOLLEY & K. JENNINGS, supra note 40, at 262.
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lies in defending advances made through the collective bargaining process, not
the law of the land.
A minority employee is therefore more reliant on arbitral competence than
the majority of his fellow workers, even given the best intentions of his union;
but it is at least questionable whether or not an arbitrator whose experience
lies in an essentially informal method of adjudication can provide adequate
coverage of Title VII protections.20 7 There are a number of authoritative labor
arbitration commentators who complain of a growing formality and legalism in
the process;0 s and this places those who advocate a greater role for arbitration
in disputes involving discrimination in something of a quandry. If arbitration
does in fact become more formal and legalistic there would be a tighter logical
argument for according a greater weight, and perhaps deference, to the award
of an arbitrator who determines a breach of a collective agreement which also
prohibits discrimination. But increasing formality is not welcomed by the arbi-
tration community; it is instead the subject of much criticism, 09 and sugges-
tions for its containment are frequently advanced.210 It is therefore appropriate
207 [T]he specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop,
not the law of the land .... Parties usually choose an arbitrator because they trust his
knowledge and judgment concerning the demands and norms of industrial relations. On
the other hand, the resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a primary responsi-
bility of courts, and judicial construction has proved especially necessary with respect to
Title VII, whose broad language frequently can be given meaning only by reference to
public law concepts.
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51.
208 Creeping Legalism In Labor Arbitration: An Editorial, 13 ARB. J. 129 (1958); Ross, The
Role Of The Law In Arbitration, 1959 PROC. OF THE TWELTH ANN. MEETING NAT'L AcAD. OF ARB.
68. Some of the traditional values of the process: the relatively speedy and economical procedure,
the avoidance of dilatory maneuvers, the likelihood of substantial justice on the merits-are increas-
ingly being jeopardized. Arbitration is losing some of its creative and inventive character as it
settles into a routine. Id. at 72. "No one has seriously contended, I believe, that formal legal princi-
ples of interpretation ought to govern the construction of a labor contract. In a labor arbitration
they would be a needless encumbrance and would probably make no difference in the result."
Fuller, supra note 190 at 11.
209 Freidin, Legal Status of Labor Arbitration, 1 N.Y.U. CoNF. LAB. 233 (1948).
Arbitrators should not be legalistic and technical. Their proceedings may be as informal
as the parties desire. The purpose of arbitration is to allow parties to have their disputes
settled without the formality and legalism of litigation, and to use the experience of men
in the trade, with full knowledge of the customs and practices, to judge and determine
the questions submitted for decision.
Braden, Current Problems in Labor-Management Arbitration, 6 ARB. J. 91, 95 (1951). See also
Usery, Appeal for More Efficient Arbitration, 1973 LAB. REL. Y.B. (BNA) 115; Move to Formality
in Arbitration, 1978 LAB. REL. Y.B. (BNA) 80; Veglahn, Arbitration Costs/Time, 30 LAB. L. J. 49
(1979).
210 See, e.g., Davey, supra note 96 at 570, where the author notes:"[P]rehearing statements
and written submission agreements are clearly aids to a more economical hearing once the latter is
under way." The author also observes that labor and management may make contractual provi-
sions for the elimination of transcripts and posthearing briefs, unless specifically required. Id. at
569. Of posthearing briefs, the author states, "In the writer's own ad hoc experience, prehearing
briefs are a rarity whereas post-hearing briefs are becoming increasingly standard practice. This
situation should be completely reversed to improve the efficiency of arbitration and make more
effective use of the present limited supply of competent, experienced and acceptable arbitrators."
Id. at 567.
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to raise some fundamental questions concerning the relationship between labor
arbitration and employment discrimination. If the traditional mission of a la-
bor arbitrator is to determine disputes under a collective agreement resulting
from the flexible process known as collective bargaining, why not confine them
entirely to this role? If a dispute arises involving a minority employee, why not
remit it to a court for adjudication, thus leaving the arbitration forum for the
majority? If the labor arbitration process is in general fraught with so many
imperfections, from a Title VII standpoint, why even bother to consider ex-
panding the jurisdiction of an arbitrator to encompass claims of discrimina-
tion? What problems lie in seeking accommodations between the traditional
function of labor arbitration and the increasingly complex area of employment
discrimination, and in what manner would arbitrators have to evince special
competence if such accommodations were made? These questions, and related
matters, will be considered in part III of this Article.
III. PROBLEMS OF ACCOMMODATION
Prior to the Gardner-Denver decision, the Supreme Court appeared to
strengthen the presumption of arbitrability in relevant collective agreements
even where considerations of external law existed. In Gateway Coal Co. v.
United Mine Workers,211 the Court found, inter alia, that an agreement to
submit disputes to arbitration required deferral even where a question of
safety under section 502 of the Taft-Hartley Act existed. 212 It also seemed at
first that some lower courts would extend a similar deferral to arbitration
where Title VII rights were involved. Thus in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.,21 s
the Sixth Circuit held that an arbitrator could finally dispose of an alleged civil
rights violation where the parties had agreed to submit the dispute to final and
binding arbitration.21 4 The affirmation of Dewey by a divided Supreme
Court 215 caused some circuits to search for appropriate deferral standards. The
most sophisticated came from the Fifth Circuit in Rios v. Reynolds Metals
Co.,2"' where it was found that an arbitral award could be upheld in the face of
an alleged Title VII violation where certain stringent criteria were met.21 7 The
211 414 U.S. 368 (1973).
212 Id. at 385-87. Section 502 provides, in pertinent part: "[N]or shall the quitting of labor by
an employee or emplbyees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at
the place of employment of such employee or employees be deemed a strike under this chapter."
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976) (quoted in 414 U.S.
at 385).
2.1 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
214 429 F.2d at 332.
25 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
216 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972).
217 First, there may be no deference to the decisions of the arbitrator unless the contrac-
tual right coincides with rights under Title VII. Second, it must be plain that the arbi-
trator's decision is in no way violative of the private rights guaranteed by Title VII, nor
of the public policy which inheres in Title VII. In addition, before deferring, the district
court must be satisfied that (1) the factual issues before it are identical to those decided
by the arbitrator; (2) the arbitrator had power under the collective agreement to decide
the ultimate issue of discrimination; (3) the evidence presented at the arbitral hearing
dealt adequately with all factual issues; (4) the arbitrator actually decided the factual
[Vol. 85
26
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 5 [1983], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol85/iss5/5
LABOR ARBITRATORS
Rios deferral standards were addressed primarily to the procedures of the arbi-
tration process and not specifically to the expertise of the arbitrator, although
given their rigor, the existence of a high degree of arbitral competence could be
necessarily implied. The Supreme Court, however, rejected the applicability of
a Rios style deferral, observing that effective enforcement of Title VII rights by
way of arbitration would make the arbitration forum "a procedurally complex,
expensive, and time-consuming process."'2 1 s The Court noted further that,
given the inappropriateness of arbitration in the protection of Title VII rights,
an employee might well resort to legal enforcement rather than arbitration if
deferral was permitted, reducing the possibility of voluntary compliance or set-
tlement of claims under the Title.2 1 The Court was therefore not ruling out
arbitration in this regard; an employee could still use the arbitration forum in
the hope of obtaining a settlement of that aspect of his claim which involved
employment discrimination,220 but if this proved unsuccessful, resort to a law-
suit was still available. 221 In the same way that the Court which decided the
Steelworkers' Trilogy was concerned with seeking to prevent massive resort to
litigation under section 301 of Taft-Hartley,222 the Gardner-Denver Court was
attempting to curb the potentially large number of lawsuits which a total rejec-
tion of the use of the arbitration forum for resolving Title VII claims would
have involved. 223
The collective bargaining system itself, and the grievance adjustment pro-
cess which it gives rise to, poses some difficult problems for minority employ-
issues presented to the court; (5) the arbitration proceeding was fair and regular and free
of procedural infirmities. The burden of proof in establishing these conditions of limita-
tion will be upon the respondent as distinguished from the claimant.
Id. at 58.
218 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 39.
219 A deferral rule also might adversely affect the arbitration system as well as the en-
forcement scheme of Title VII. Fearing that the arbitral forum cannot adequately pro-
tect their rights under Title VII, some employees may elect to bypass arbitration and
institute a lawsuit. The possibility of voluntary compliance or settlement of Title VII
claims would thus be reduced, and the result could well be more litigation, not less.
Id. at 59.
220 Id. at 52.
221 We think, therefore, that the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and
the federal policy against discriminatory employment practices can best be accommo-
dated by permitting an employee to pursue fully both his remedy under the grievance-
arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining agreement and his cause of action under Ti-
tle VII. The federal court should consider the employee's claim de novo.
Id. at 59-60.
222 W. OBERER, K. HANSLOWE & J. ANDERSEN, LABOR LAw-COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN A FREE
SociETY 672-73 (2d ed. 1979).
222 The availability of multiple forums, however, does not mean that justice is necessarily
being served. In too many cases, the individual does not know of the alternatives, and
even if action is filed, the current backlog of cases may prevent justice. The prime exam-
ple is the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). During its first year of
operation, it had a backlog of 8,000 cases. By 1976, this had increased to over 150,000
cases, thus causing many charges to be in investigation for years with the result being
fading of memories and unavailability of records. The effect of this is that many charges
are never resolved.
Rubenfeld & Strouble, Arbitration and EEO Issues, 30 LAB. L.J. 489 (1979).
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ees. The negotiation and administration of a collective agreement requires an
often delicate balancing with the rights and interests of the majority of the
workforce against those of a minority which may consider itself adversely af-
fected; and this may be so even when no question of employment dis-
criminaton is involved.22 Differences in treatment of this kind are permissible
under the law when they are reasonably related to the objectives of the collec-
tive agreement.2 25 A union is permitted to engage in this form of discrimination
provided its conduct complies with what has been observed to be its duty of
fair representation. The earliest judicial ruling on this duty concerned an in-
stance of blatant racial discrimination. In Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 226 the Supreme Court was confronted with a situation in which a union
negotiated a collective agreement which clearly discriminated against black
employees. 227 The Court found that the right of the union to represent employ-
ees in a designated unit under the Railway Labor Act of 1926228 required the
union to observe a correlative obligation to represent all employees fairly, not
simply white employees.229 The concept of fair representation was extended to
the administration of a collective agreement in Vaca v. Sipes,23 0 where the Su-
preme Court held that an employee does not have an absolute right to require
the processing of a grievance all the way to arbitration; the union being free to
select, in its capacity as sole bargaining agent, claims which it deemed worth
pursuing from those which it considered without merit, provided that it did so
in a manner which was not "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. '231 The
Supreme Court dealt with the status of an arbitral award where the duty of
fair representation had been breached in Hines v. Anchor Freight Inc.,
23 2
where it found that the failure of a union to act in accordance with this stan-
dard was grounds for overturning the finality bar of arbitration.23 3
The existence of a duty of fair representation does little to assuage the
2 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
225 Id. at 338.
220 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
221 Id. at 195-96.
228 41 Stat. 456.
229 While the majority of the craft chooses the bargaining representative, when chosen it
represents, as the Act by its terms makes plain, the craft or class, and not the majority.
The fair interpretation of the statutory language is that the organization chosen to rep-
resent a craft is to represent all its members, the majority as well as the minority ....
Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers comparable to
those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of those whom
it represents, but it has also imposed on the representative a corresponding duty.
323 U.S. at 202.
2320 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
31 Id. at 190.
232 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
233 The grievance process cannot be expected to be error-free. The finality provision has
sufficient force to surmount occasional instances of mistake. But it is quite another mat-
ter to suggest that erroneous arbitration decisions must stand even though the em-
ployee's representation by the Union has been dishonest, in bad faith or discriminatory;
for in that event error and injustice of the grossest sort would multiply.
Id. at 571. See Note, Finality and Fair Representation, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 309 (1977).
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fears of those concerned with the effectuation of Title VII protections. As it is
based on a union's collective bargaining and contract administraton function,
it necessarily involves majoritarian processes rather than protection of individ-
ual rights. The individual worker must be fairly and impartially represented on
the basis of the collectively agreed terms of the contract, not on the provisions
of the Title. Obviously, where a minority employee's access to arbitration was
denied on grounds which violated Title VII, a breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation could also be established." 4 But in general the burden of proof in a
duty of fair representation action is a heavy one,23 5 and in the view of some, it
is too great for effective enforcement of Title VII rights.23 6 A growing number
of collective agreements have clauses prohibiting employment discrimination,
but again, Title VII protection might fall by the wayside as a uhion exercises
its right to accept or reject a grievance for processing to arbitration on grounds
that accord with the objects of the contract, which may or may not be congru-
ent with the claim of the aggrieved minority employee. 3 7 Remitting the griev-
ances of minority employees to a separate procedure than that applicable to
the rest of the workforce would seem a practical alternative to the prevalent
system of unitary grievance adjustment, but as one authority has noted,238 the
maintenance of separate procedures would in itself most likely be a breach of
the duty of fair representation as well as a violation of Title VII.2
3 9
Arbitrators have sometimes dealt with employment discrimination claims
in the normal course of contract interpretation by applying a standard of "just
cause" in discipline and discharge cases.2 40 Collective agreements usually con-
tain this particular limitation on what would otherwise be considered an un-
restricted right of management,24 1 but where this is not provided for expressly
in a contract, arbitrators will often imply its existence.24 2 However, given the
best intentions, the ingenuity of labor arbitrators is not enough to cope with
2*4 Hill, The Union's Duty To Process Discrimination Claims, ARB. J., Sept. 1977, 180, 183
(1977).
215 But the burden on employees will remain a substantial one, far too heavy in the opin-
ion of some. To prevail against either the company or the union, petitioners must show
not only that their discharge was contrary to the contract but must also carry the burden
of demonstrating breach of duty by the Union. As the district court indicated, this in-
volves more than demonstrating mere errors in judgment.
Anchor Freight, 424 U.S. at 570-71.
236 See Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 24 ARB. J.
197, 201 (1969).
237 Glanstein, Arbitration of EEO Issues: A Dissenting View, 1980 32d N.Y.U. Conf. Lab. 155,
163-64.
238 Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Discrimination: The Parties' Process and the Public's
Purposes, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 724 (1976).
211 Id. at 734.
2,o Blumrosen, Labor Arbitration, EEOC Conciliation, and Discrimination In Employment,
24 ARn. J. 88, 90-92 (1969).
" For an excellent theoretical treatment of management rights see Killingsworth, The Presi-
dential Address: Management Rights Revisited, 1969 PRoc. OF THE TWENTY-SECOND ANN. MEETING
NAT'L ACAD. or ARB. 1.
2,2 Fleming, The Labor Arbitration Process: 1943-1963, 1964 PROC. OF THE SEVENTEENTH ANN.
MEETING NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. 33, 46. See also Killingsworth & Wallen, Constraint And Variety In
Arbitration Systems, at 78-79.
1983]
29
Bartlett: Employment Discrimination and Labor Arbitrators: A Question of Co
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1983
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
the problems of processing a grievance involving Title VII matters because of
the nature of the overall system in which they operate. Assuming that a minor-
ity employee has successfully surmounted the difficult obstacles presented by
the duty of fair representation, an arbitrator is mandated to determine griev-
ance disputes under the terms of a collective agreement. It is generally agreed
that an arbitrator should not import his personal standards of equity and fair-
ness where these would conflict with the express or implied provisions of the
contract.243 Arbitrators would, of course, be less than human if they did not
unconsciously infer their own notions of justice into a disputed matter from
time to time, but even if they were given express permission to do so (in prac-
tice an unlikely proposition) this would in and of itself be too flimsy a basis for
adequately disposing of minority claims under the collective agreement.
2 4 4
Where considerations of external law exist alongside questions of interpre-
tation of collectively agreed terms, arbitration scholars are divided on the ex-
tent to which the law should be taken into account by a labor arbitrator.2 4
The terms of a collective agreement may require that an arbitrator consider
applicable areas of law, or they may restrict his ability to do so. 24 0 It is felt that
an arbitrator, where not required to examine anything but the relevant con-
tractual clauses, should not require conduct forbidden by the law in his award,
even though he may permit it.2 47 The general position is that an arbitrator may
consider all relevant areas, including external law, for guidance in the compila-
tion of his award;248 the debate in the arbitration community centers upon
whether or not he should do so. 249 Even assuming an affirmative response to
213 F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 34, at 320. See also United Steelworkers v. Enter-
prise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
2, "Even the remedies in arbitration leave something to be desired. They may be limited by
the particular collective agreement or the arbitrator clothed with unlimited discretion to fashion
remedies may be reluctant to utilize an injunction or other affirmative action sought in Title VII
Claims." Glanstein, supra note 237, at 166.
24" For a treatment of the main arbitral tendencies on the relationship between labor arbitra-
tion and external law see Mittenthal, The Role of Law In Arbitration, 1968 PROC. OF THE TWENTY-
FIRST ANN. MEETING NAT'L ACAD. OF ARE. 42.
246 Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law, And Arbitration, 1967 PROC. OF THE TWENTI-
ETH ANN. MEETING NAT'L ACAD. OF ARE. 1, 23.
27 "Although the arbitrator's award may permit conduct forbidden by law but sanctioned by
contract, it should not require conduct forbidden by law even though sanctioned by contract."
(Emphasis as in original). Mittenthal, The Role of Law In Arbitration, supra note 245, at 50. See
also Cox, The Plade Of Law In Labor Arbitration, 1957 SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE FIRST SEVEN
ANN. MEETINGS OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. 1948-1954, 76. "The principle requires only that the
arbitrator look to see whether sustaining the grievance would require conduct the law forbids or
would enforce an illegal contract; if so, the arbitrator should not sustain the grievance." Id. at 79.
248 Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration In The Light Of The Lincoln Mills Case, PROC.
OF THE TWELTH ANN. MEETING NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. 24. "The governing criteria are not judge-made
principles of the common law but the practices, assumptions, understandings and aspirations of
the going industrial concern. The arbitrator is not bound by conventional law, although he may
follow it." Id. at 46.
2149 See Meltzer, supra note 246.
One such question is how the just-cause standard should be applied and the applicable
burden of persuasion defined where a grievant's employment ... involves substantial
risk to the public and to fellow employees and where regulation imposes duties on em-'
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this inquiry, the question then becomes one of whether or not arbitrators are
in fact competent to do so. After the Gardner-Denver decision there were
many calls for the training of arbitrators in the requirements of employment
discrimination law,215 some even advocating certification of those wishing to
determine Title VII matters.2 51 Conflicting viewpoints appeared in the labor
arbitration literature; some alleging that arbitrators could, with sufficient
training, handle adequately the task of applying Title VII principles to griev-
ances before them;252 others alleging that they did not have the necessary ex-
pertise to do so.253 There was no doubt whatsoever in the mind of Professor
Meltzer when he observed: "But it is with respect to precisely these [Title VII]
questions that arbitrators lack any special competence. '254
Professor Harry Edwards initially took a similar stance. 55 His apprehen-
ployers that reflect the risks involved. In such situations there is no necessary incompati-
bility between the contractual standard and that drawn from regulation or public policy;
for the contractual standard is formulated loosely, presumably for the purpose of permit-
ting consideration of all relevant factors, including, of course, the relevant regulation or
public policy. Similarly, where a contractual provision is susceptible to two interpreta-
tions, one compatible with, and the other repugnant to, an applicable statute, the statute
is a relevant factor for interpretation. Arbitral interpretation of agreements, like judicial
interpretation of statutes, should seek to avoid a construction that would be invalid
under a higher law.
Id. at 15.
Further, Professor Meltzer notes:
If the parties in their submission made it clear that they wanted an advisory opin-
ion, so to speak, on what the law permitted, I might give them an advisory opinion. But I
think I would make it clear to them, formally and informally, that the opinion was only
advisory, that they could not expect an official tribunal to give that kind of award the
same deference that is granted to an award grounded in the agreement.
Meltzer, supra note 246, at 31.
250 See, e.g., Webster, Arbitrating Title VII Disputes: A Proposal, ARH. J., March 1978, 25, 28.
25 For an instructive treatment of the certification question see Coulson, Certification And
Training Of Labor Arbitrators: Should Arbitrators Be Certified? 1977 PROC. OF THE THIRTIETH
ANN. MEETING NAT'L AcAD. OF ARB. 173.
252 See, e.g., Blumrosen, Individual Worker-Employer Arbitration Under Title VII, 31
N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 329, 338-39 (1978).
1s' See, e.g., Robinson & Neal, Arbitration And Discrimination, 1976 PROC. OF THE TWENTY-
NINTH ANN. MEETING NAT'L AcAD. OF ARB. 20, 42.
254 Meltzer, supra note 238, at 732.
25 The misgivings of Professor Edwards concerning the adequacy of the arbitration process
and the ability of arbitrators to cope with the requirements of employment discrminations law
were demonstrated in his thoughtful paper.
The evidence as to whether and how many arbitrators are professionally competent to
decide legal issues in cases involving claims of employment discrimination is at best
mixed. Furthermore, even assuming, arguendo, that most arbitrators are professionally
competent to decide such issues, the nature of the arbitration process often will not allow
for full and adequate consideration of an employee's Title VII rights. Finally, the evi-
dence from the survey suggests that even when arbitrators are professionally competent
to decide legal issues and when the arbitration process is adequate to allow for full con-
sideration of legal questions arising pursuant to Title VII, still many arbitrators believe
that they have no business interpreting or applying a public statute in a contractual
grievance dispute. . . .Arbitrators, unlike judges, are accountable only to the parties
and their decisions are rarely subject to judicial review. The simple fact is that arbitra-
tors are not responsible for developing principles of public law. . . .Therefore, even if
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sion about using contractual procedures to resolve Title VII disputes being
based on" the conclusion that most collective agreements were constructed on
the principles of good collective bargaining and not the requirements of exter-
nal law.25 16 Collectively agreed provisions incorporating a prohibition against
discrimination did little to ease his misgivings about the ability of arbitrators
to cope with employment discrimination matters and he tartly observed: "The
arbitrator and the parties must recognize that he is no more qualified to ascer-
tain the law just because the parties say so. ' '257 These highly authoritative
voices notwithstanding, the inclusion of antidiscrimination clauses in collective
agreements continued to the point where it became perceived as a feature of
good industrial relations practice to so incorporate them. 5 The use of arbitra-
tion to determine grievance disputes involving claims of discrimination could
not therefore be brushed aside, as such matters became part and parcel of
what was heretofore acknowledged as being within the competence of labor
arbitrators-the determination of disputed terms of a collective agreement.259
An additional factor necessitating a fundamental reassessment of the role of
arbitration in employment discrimination was the alarming backlog of cases
lodged with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).200 This
body started with an ambitious mission but quickly found itself bogged down
in the intricacies of enforcement. 261 As its workload reached staggering propor-
some arbitrators are better qualified than some judges to decide certain issues, this still
would not militate in favor of a deferral rule in cases involving claims of employment
discrimination.
Edwards, Arbitration Of Employment Discrimination Cases: An Empirical Study, 1975 PROC. OF
THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ANN. MEETING NAT'L AcAD. of Arbitrators 59, 82-83.
251 Edwards, Labor Arbitration At The Crossroads: The 'Common Law of the Shop' v. Exter-
nal Law, ARB. J., June 1971, 65, 86.
25:7 Id. at 79.
118 Coulson, supra note 150.
Management and labor are already moving. Most employers have created affirmative
compliance programs. As new cases spell out evolving legal obligations, employers scram-
ble into line. . . .All of this provides a new challenge for those of us who encourage
contract arbitration. Conflicts between the union contract and job-discrimination laws
can be arbitrated. Arbitrators can help employers bring about necessary compliance,
with the least possible disruption in the production process. The union will want to par-
ticipate in this effort.
Id. at 237.
259 "Seemingly, arbitration must now satisfy a new client. Arbitrators have learned to accom-
modate the needs of labor lawyers, business agents, and personnel directors. When discrimination
issues are involved, labor arbitration may have now become a consumer tribunal." Id.
260 Siegel, Arbitration of EEO Issues: A Positive View, 1980 32 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 139, 143
(1980).
I think, by using arbitration, we can reduce the strain on people and the strain on ad-
ministrative and judicial resources. I also believe that it will allow us to build up the
integrity of our systems. . . .Now arbitration is not the panacea, and I immediately
point that out. But it does offer what I think is the best hope as the alternative remedy
in this field.
Id. at 148.
"' For a summary of the first six months of operation of the EEOC see Equal Employment
Opportunity, 1966 LAB. REL. Y.B. (BNA) 341-61. By 1967 the EEOC was already feeling the pres-
sures and problems generated by its increasing workload. See Problems of EEOC in Policing Em-
ployment Discrimination, 1967 LAB. REL. Y.B. (BNA) 432-38.
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262tions, one EEOC Commissioner regretfully acknowledged that its policing
and enforcement function resembled "all the clout of a feather duster; 26 3 and
by 1977 a study conducted by the General Accounting Office concluded that
the EEOC was "confused, fragmented, and in disarray.
264
The intensely practical problems encountered by the EEOC led to a soft-
ening of some of the theoretical objections to the use of arbitration. Professor
Edwards, for example, while still retaining many of his misgivings about the
arbitration process in the effectuation of minority rights, suggested that with
suitable safeguards, a modified form of arbitration might prove valuable in eas-
ing some of the practical problems of enforcement.26 5 He proposed the estab-
lishment of a "two-track" system under which statutory questions would be
eliminated from arbitration;26 only "hybrid" grievances alleging both a breach
of the collective agreement and a violation of Title VII would proceed.267
Another interesting attempt at arbitral modification to cope with discrimi-
nation claims was provided by the AAA, which constructed a set of model
rules268 designed to establish greater confidence by the parties in the use of
arbitration to resolve discrimination claims.269 Basically these rules require
that the parties consist of the individual employee and the employer, that the
individual be represented by a personal attorney, that the Federal Rules of
Evidence be used for guidance, and that the arbitrator be selected from a panel
composed of persons with a background in employment discrimination law and
practice.270 Modifications such as these will require a certain increase in for-
mality,271 but this may not lead to greater formalism in the arbitration system
262 It was estimated that by 1974, in terms of caseload, the EEOC was rapidly pushing the
National Labor Relations Board into second place. See Discussion at Discrimination at NYU
Conference, 1974 LAB. REL. Y.B. (BNA) 137, 138. See also Rubenfeld and Strouble, supra note
223.
The dilemma concerning the appropriate role for arbitration procedures in the resolution
of discrimination complaints is a product of the choice of forums open to the aggrieved
party. Besides arbitration, an individual may also file a complaint with the EEOC, other
federal regulatory agencies, a federal district court, a state equal opportunity agency or a
state court. In most cases, an individual can pursue these actions concurrently or await a
decision which, if unfavorable, can be relitigated in a new action.
Id. at 489.
263 EEOC Commissioner Leach on Improvement, 1976 LAB. REL. Y.B. (BNA) 195.
26 GAO Appraisal of Federal EEO Effort, 1977 LAB. REL. Y.B. (BNA) 351.
265 Edwards, Arbitration as an Alternative in Equal Employment Disputes 33 ARB. J. 23
(1978).
2" Id. at 24.
267 "In cases that implicate Title VII xights, the two-track system would permit arbitration in
only those cases in which the grievance alleges an act that might be considered a violation of both
the collective bargaining agreement and of Title VII." Id.
16& See Anderson, Arbitration and the Law: "A Better Way", 30 LAB. L.J. 259 (1979). "The
procedures are intended to resolve matters concerning statutory rights rather than contractual
rights. They may be used in nonunion as well as organized places of employment." Id. at 266.
269 Coulson, Fair Treatment: Voluntary Arbitration of Employee Claims, 33 ARB. J. 23, 25
(1978).
270 Id. at 24-29.
271 See Bloch, Labor Arbitration's Crossroads Revisited: The Role Of The Arbitrator And
The Response Of The Courts, 47 U. CIN. L. REv. 363 (1978).
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as a whole, as the persons selected to arbitrate hybrid disputes will not be
drawn from the larger panels of organizations such as the AAA and FMCS but
rather from small select lists.272 Adaptations such as the foregoing do not also
depart very far theoretically from the role of arbitration as a settlement pro-
ducing mechanism which the Gardner-Denver Court envisaged;27 3 and all con-
cerned may have strong motivations to use arbitration in this way rather than
resort to a lawsuit. The employer may use it to avoid the prospect of relitiga-
tion in the federal forum;274 the union may feel it prudent to do so in satisfac-
tion of the demands of the duty of fair representation;7 5 and the individual
employee concerned may use it to avoid the inordinate delay involved in filing
with the EEOC, in the knowledge that the way to court remains open in the
more complicated cases,2 76 or even in the simpler cases where the employee
remains dissatisfied with the arbitrator's award. Labor arbitration may there-
fore prove useful in building a climate of opinion in which some of the policy
objectives of Title VII will be absorbed into collective bargaining practice and
find their ultimate repose as an integral part of the conventional wisdom of
industrial relations.2 77
Ideally, internal grievance machinery should be informal, speedy, inexpensive and re-
sponsive to the particular problems of the workplace. Yet, in the final analysis, Edwards'
screening criteria merely add another, rather complex step to this process ...
Arbitration is the substitute for industrial strife or strikes, and parties must make every
imaginable effort to keep the systems procedurally simple. The requirements of due pro-
cess and the difficult business of talking plainly to one another create a sufficiently ardu-
ous task. We need not complicate it further by the prospect of deciding which procedure
goes with which grievant, thereby adding an additional level of potential dispute.
Id. at 368.
272 Coulson, supra note 269.
In discrimination claims between the individual employees and their employer, a knowl-
edge of the employment discrimination law is important. Arbitrators should also be sen-
sitive to the behavioral subtleties involved in dealing across barriers of sex, race, or eth-
nic differences, and familiar with employment practices. The arbitrator must not only be
capable of reading a fair decision, but must also appear to be fair, both to the individual
claimant and to the employer.
The American Arbitration Association has assembled a panel of arbitrators familiar with
employment discrimination matters. These people will be included on lists submitted to
parties seeking an arbitrator for such cases. It is particularly important that both attor-
neys have confidence in the arbitrator selected to hear their case. Not only are compli-
cated legal concepts involved, but delicate human prejudices may color an arbitrator's
judgment. Mutually acceptable appointments will be more confidently made after parties
have had an opportunity to review the performance of the panel members in such dis-
crimination cases.
Id. at 24.
27 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 55.
274 See Coulson, Another Seat At The Table: Gardner-Denver 1974, 27 N.Y.U. CONF. LAD.
201, 210 (1975).
27' Edwards, supra note 255, at 66.
276 See Meltzer, The Impact Of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver On Labor Arbitration, 27
N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 189 (1975). "The Court recognized that an arbitrator is competent to deal with
. . . overlapping contractual and statutory issues and that his award might finally resolve such
issues. But it is an employee's acquiescence in an award adverse to him, not the law that produces
finality." Id. at 192.
277 See Cohen & Eaby, The Gardner-Denver Decision and Labor Arbitration 27 LAB. L.J. 18,
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CONCLUSION
Labor arbitrators are generally acknowledged to be in possession of a spe-
cialized competence in relation to the traditional function of labor arbitra-
tion.2 7 8 It remains to be seen whether or not they will achieve a reputation of
similar status where the additional perspective of employment discrimination
is involved. The future contains an element of hope, however, for several good
reasons. Chief among these is the fact that the Gardner-Denver Court itself
left some room for the labor arbitration community to explore and experiment
with various ways of ascertaining what form of contribution the arbitration
process might best make in the effectuation of the policy objectives of Title
VII.2 7 9 Another encouraging factor is that the proponents of labor arbitration
have not been lax in seeking to find ways of amending the traditional arbitra-
tion process to accommodate the purposes of Title VII.280 The parties them-
selves further show signs of incorporating protections against employment dis-
crimination as a normal part of the collective bargaining system,28 1 which
means that such matters will lead inexorably to arbitration for determination.
Last, but by no means least, many arbitrators are actively striving to enlarge
their area of competence to include a mastery of employment discrimination
law and practice.28 2
(1976):
While a number of industrial relations practioners have argued in favor of abandoning
arbitration in discrimination cases, the argument would appear to be premature in view
of the Court's suggestion that the awards of arbitrators be given appropriate weight in
judicial proceedings. There are, furthermore, distinct advantages to labor arbitration
and, over time, these advantages may become as apparent in civil rights disputes as they
are elsewhere. The economy and efficiency of arbitration, for example, may prove to be
sufficiently attractive so as to assure that arbitration will, in fact, be the final step in
many disputes over civil rights at the workplace.
Id. at 23. See also Hill, The Authority of a Labor Arbitrator to Decide Legal Issues Under a
Collective Bargaining Contract: The Situation After Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 10 IND. L.
REV. 899, 929-30 (1977).
271 Feller, The Impact Of External Law Upon Labor Arbitration, THE FUTURE OF LABOR AR-
BITRATION IN AMERICA 83.
[T]he nature of the decision which the arbitrator makes is one which he is peculiarly
competent to make and which the courts are not competent to make.... This special
competence is the essential premise upon which rests the freedom from review which the
courts have granted to labor arbitrators.
Id. at 109. Rock, The Presidential Address: A "Maintenance of Standards" Clause For Arbitra-
tors, 1975 PROC. OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH ANN. MEETING NAT'L ACAD. 1, 8-9.
279 Aksen, Post-Gardner-Denver Developments In Arbitration Law, 1975 PROC. OF THE
TWENTY-EIGHT ANN. MEETING NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. 24. "I submit that there was no reason to
articulate Footnote 21 so carefully unless the Court still truly believed in the salutary adjudication
process so well known to all members of the NAA and this audience here today." Id. at 27.
280 For an evaluation of the main proposals see Bloch, supra note 271, at 368-73.
281 Newman, Post-Gardner-Denver Developments In The Arbitration Of Discrimination
Claim, 1975 PROC. OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ANN. MEETING NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. 36, 38-39. See also
Coulson, supra note 150.
282 For an examination and analysis of the manner in which arbitrators are applying the regu-
lations and principles of employment discrimination in the arbitration process see Oppenheimer &
LaVan, Arbitration Awards in Discrimination Disputes: An Empirical Analysis, AREB. J., March
1979 12.
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While the Supreme Court has accordingly reserved a role for labor arbitra-
tion in the resolution of employment discrimination claims, uncertainty still
exists in the courts as to what its appropriate function ought to be,2s3 an uncer-
tainty whose origins lie in the puzzling Footnote 21 of the Gardner-Denver
decision .1 4 It will doubtless be necessary for the Supreme Court to issue a
more definitive statement at some time in the future in order to amplify this
meager source of authority. Footnote 21 makes it clear that the traditional pro-
cedures of arbitration will have to be tightened in order for an arbitrator's
award to be ascribed any weight;28 5 it is not difficult to grasp what the Court
meant when it required, for example, an adequate record of the arbitration
proceeding. The procedural modifications treated in the latter part of this Arti-
cle may therefore be instrumental in easing some of the workload of the
EEOC, and the courts as the ranks of the dissatisfied are commensurately re-
duced; and for those who insist on a lawsuit, these modifications may help in
achieving an allocation of weight to an arbitral award by a court.
What remains unclear in regard to the criteria of Footnote 21 is the nature
of "the special competence of particular arbitrators" which the Court required
as a factor in ascribing weight to an award. The skills required of a labor arbi-
trator for the determination of grievance disputes are basically judicial in na-
ture.2 6 But another important dimension is worthy of consideration in any as-
sessment of the abilities of arbitrators, namely, responsibility for the conduct
of the entire proceedings.28 7 Unaided by courtroom procedure, he must main-
tain order and stability in the hearing before he even gets to the exercise of
contract interpretaton skills and techniques. The ability to maintain both or-
der and informality in the proceedings places a considerable strain upon the
arbitrator's expertise, especially where each side has legal representation.2 "
183 For an analysis of the factors contributing to this uncertainty see Jacobs, Confusion Re-
mains Five Years After Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 30 LAB. L.J. 623 (1979).
284 The effect of Gardner-Denver, in large measure because of this footnote, has been to
confuse rather than to clarify the relationship of Title VII claims and arbitration. The
very purpose of announcing such a broad remedial approach was undercut by footnote 21
and the different interpretations of it. . . . The Court's position is ambiguous. If Gard-
ner-Denver really means that deferral to arbitration is preferable under certain circum-
stances, the Court should have articulated such a standard. Rejecting completely the
appropriateness of arbitration in Title VII matters, only to repostulate a standard of
deferral . . . makes implementation of Gardner-Denver more like solving a riddle.
Id. at 627-28.
285 Williams, A Modest Proposal for the Immediate Future, 1976 PROC. OF THE TWENTY-
NINTH ANN. MEETING NAT'L AcAn. OF ARB. 34, 42-45.
286 Feller, The Role of Arbitration In State And National Labor Policy, 1975 Pnoc. oF THE
TWENTY-FoURTH ANN. MEETING NAT'L AcAD. OF ARB. 42, 80; Linn, Situation Ethics And The Arbi-
trator's Role, 1973 PROC. OF THE TW ENTY-SIxTH ANN. MEETING NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. 162, 176.
187 Luskin, The Presidential Address: Arbitration And Its Critics, 1968 PRoc. oF THE
TWENTY-FIRST ANN. MEETING NAT'L AcAD. OF ARE. 125, 126; Ryder, The Impact of Acceptability
On The Arbitrator, at 94, 100-01.
2'8 Seitz, Some Observations On The Role Of An Arbitrator, 34 ARB. J., Sept. 1979, 3.
What is being put forward here requires an appreciation of the objectives of an arbitra-
tion hearing beyond the fundamental purpose of affording a fair hearing to the parties.
The purpose of the hearing is misconceived if it is seen merely as a theatre affording the
advocates an opportunity to act out the script they had written for themselves (or which
[Vol. 85
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LABOR ARBITRATORS
Arbitrators purporting to determine disputes involving both a breach of the
collective agreement and a possible violation of Title VII must now add to the
above noted skills a knowledge of employment discrimination law and prac-
tice.289 Arbitrator competence may therefore be justifiably regarded as the
most crucial of the Footnote 21 requirements because, where it is lacking, the
observance of the remaining criteria would be rendered futile. Even leaving
aside the allocation of weight to an arbitral award in the federal forum, a high
degree of competence will still be required in order to make arbitration func-
tion effectively as a settlement producing mechanism.2 90 Continued resort by
unions and employers to the labor arbitration process for resolution of their
grievances testifies to the fact that they repose a considerable amount of confi-
dence in the knowledge and skills of arbitrators. As Title VII consideratons
become increasingly intertwined with those of collective bargaining, through
the agency of the collective agreement, a higher premium will be placed on the
competence of labor arbitrators. With the development of such competence by
arbitrators, the Supreme Court might be persuaded to reconsider the theoreti-
cal basis of its rejection of dererral to arbitration, and they might provide a
form of guidance more consonant with both the objectives of the Title and the
realities of enforcement in the world of labor relations.
their client desires to be acted out). If the arbitrator does not conduct the hearing with a
strong and active hand, it can deteriorate rapidly into a travesty. Counsel, moving from a
courtroom into an arbitration hearing, will defeat the goals of the arbitration process.
Arbitrators who fail to conduct and give proper direction to a hearing so that it will
develop the kind of record required, fail in their professional responsibilities.
Id. at 7.
289 Wolkinson & Liberson, The Arbitration of Sex Discrimination Grievances 37(2) ARB. J.,
June 1982, 35.
In many cases the application of traditional rules of contract construction to just cause,
seniority, and non-discrimination provisions, as well as the application of standards of
reasonableness and fair play, have contributed to the protection of minority rights. Addi-
tionally, the basic harmony between legal policy and arbitration reflects the increased
willingness of arbitrators to apply external law when adjudicating contractual rights.
(emphasis supplied).
Id. at 43. See also Newman, supra note 281, at 47-51. For an interesting analysis of the ways in
which some labor arbitrators treat employment discrimination principles in their decision-making
see Coulson, Title Seven Arbitration in Action, 27 LAB. L.J. 141 (1976).
290 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974):
Where the collective-bargaining agreement contains a non-discrimination clause similar
to Title VII, and where arbitral procedures are fair and regular, arbitration may well
produce a settlement satisfactory to both employer and employee. An employer thus has
an incentive to make available the conciliatory and therapeutic processes of arbitration
which may satisfy an employee's perceived need to resort to the judicial forum, thus
saving the employer the expense and aggravation associated with a lawsuit. For similar
reasons the employee also has a strong incentive to arbitrate grievances, and arbitration
may often eliminate those misunderstandings or discriminatory practices that might oth-
erwise precipitate resort to the judicial forum.
Id. at 55.
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